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In Nieves v Bartlett, the Supreme Court holds that plaintiffs alleging retalia-
tory arrests are generally required to prove a lack of probable cause to arrest; there 
is one small exception for plaintiffs who can demonstrate by “objective evidence” that 
similarly situated individuals would not have been arrested but for the protected 
speech at issue. Unfortunately, neither the general rule nor the exception in this re-
cent ruling will help many victims of retaliation. The expansion of the criminal code 
to cover petty indiscretions means police officers will not have any difficulty identi-
fying probable cause to arrest for something. As to the Nieves exception, obtaining 
records of arrests that did not occur requires proving a negative—never an easy task. 
Importantly, the opinion requires courts to disregard even credible evidence of retal-
iatory intent at the threshold level, unless the plaintiff can show lack of probable 
cause or provide evidence regarding similarly situated individuals. 
As Justice Neil Gorsuch tentatively suggests in his Nieves opinion, the rule 
from United States v Armstrong, which governs the discovery bar for selective pros-
ecution claims, is a much better fit than the Nieves majority’s rigid rule. Although 
the Armstrong Court crafted an analogous similarly-situated-individuals require-
ment, the opinion left open whether direct evidence of intent could allow litigants to 
sidestep that requirement. Given the centrality of intent to both selective prosecution 
and retaliatory arrest claims, courts should follow Armstrong in the retaliatory ar-
rest context and consider evidence of intent at the start of litigation. While evidence 
of prosecutorial intent rarely comes to light, retaliatory arrest plaintiffs will have 
significantly more access to evidence of police intent, making the Armstrong rule 
more useful in this context—especially in the age of cellphone videos and civilian 
vigilance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In May 2019, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the 
long-disputed standard for First Amendment retaliatory arrest 
claims. Nieves v Bartlett1 holds that, as a threshold matter,2 a 
plaintiff must prove a lack of probable cause for their arrest, but 
that a “narrow qualification”—an exception to the probable cause 
burden—“is warranted for circumstances where officers have 
probable cause to make arrests, but typically exercise their dis-
cretion not to do so.”3 However, to show this exception applies, 
plaintiffs must present “objective” evidence that similarly situ-
ated offenders who were not exercising their free speech rights 
were not arrested.4 Importantly, under the “narrow qualification,” 
a plaintiff must present evidence regarding similarly situated in-
dividuals at the threshold level, even if they have direct evidence 
 
 1 139 S Ct 1715 (2019). 
 2 As a case deciding the threshold requirements for retaliatory arrest claims, 
Nieves’s holding governs what showings a plaintiff is required to make before a court will 
consider other elements of their claim. See id at 1727. 
 3 Id (emphasis added). While the majority uses the term “narrow qualification,” it 
is framed as an exception to the no-probable-cause requirement throughout the majority 
opinion, and the other Nieves opinions frame it as an exception rather than a qualification. 
 4 Id. 
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of retaliatory animus.5 Under Nieves, evidence of a police officer’s 
intent, such as the officer’s statements prior to or during an ar-
rest, is ignored at the threshold level.6 
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Neil Gor-
such notes that the narrow qualification rule appears similar to 
the standard for discovery in selective prosecution claims.7 This 
standard was established in United States v Armstrong,8 which 
requires defendants to show that “similarly situated individuals 
of a different race were not prosecuted” before proceeding to dis-
covery.9 However, Armstrong left open the possibility that plain-
tiffs could use direct evidence of unconstitutional intent, in lieu of 
comparison-based evidence regarding similarly situated suspects, 
to meet the burden.10 Analogizing to Armstrong, Justice Gorsuch 
reads Nieves to similarly allow direct evidence of intent to be con-
sidered at the threshold level in certain circumstances.11 In his 
opinion, he advocates for lower courts to apply Nieves “com-
monsensically” by giving plaintiffs some evidentiary flexibility.12 
However, the majority’s requirement that threshold evidence be 
“objective” makes it unlikely that courts will consider even credi-
ble evidence of intent at the threshold level. 
If comparison-based evidence regarding similarly situated in-
dividuals is required in every retaliatory arrest case that fails the 
no-probable-cause test, many victims will be left without redress. 
Because police officers are permitted to arrest for minor offenses 
and criminal laws cover many petty violations, officers can often 
justify a retaliatory arrest with probable cause (for something). 
Thus, many potential plaintiffs must rely on the narrow qualifi-
cation. Unfortunately, the Nieves majority requires plaintiffs to 
prove a negative—that similarly situated offenders were not ar-
rested—and evidence of non-arrests will be difficult or impossible 
to find in most circumstances. Thus, victims of police retaliation 
will have little recourse in the wake of Nieves. 
Nieves also muddles the Court’s rulings in cases involving un-
constitutional intent. The majority improperly transplants 
 
 5 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1727 (noting that “[b]ecause this inquiry is objective, the state-
ments and motivations of the particular arresting officer are ‘irrelevant’ at this stage”). 
 6 See id. 
 7 See id 1733 (Gorsuch concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 8 517 US 456 (1996). 
 9 Id at 465. 
 10 See id at 469 n 3. 
 11 See Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1734 (Gorsuch concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 12 Id, quoting id at 1741 (Sotomayor dissenting). 
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Fourth Amendment reasonableness doctrine and applies it to a 
category of claims that depend on the defendant’s intent, not on 
whether their actions were objectively reasonable.13 In contrast, 
the Armstrong standard governs selective prosecution claims, 
which hinge on discriminatory intent, not whether a prosecution 
was otherwise reasonable.14 Because the question of intent is at 
the heart of both selective prosecution and retaliation claims, 
Armstrong offers a more appropriate framework than the Fourth 
Amendment doctrine cited by the majority. 
This Comment argues that applying Armstrong to retaliatory 
arrest claims would open up more opportunities for victims to 
seek recourse than the existing Nieves framework provides, while 
avoiding Nieves’s doctrinal problems. Applying Armstrong to re-
taliatory arrest suits would create a threshold requirement that 
plaintiffs could meet if they could show that (1) the defendant of-
ficer lacked probable cause, (2) similarly situated individuals 
were not or would not have been arrested, or (3) credible evidence 
of the defendant officer’s unconstitutional intent exists. This 
would give plaintiffs a crucial third way to meet the threshold re-
quirement for their claims’ survival and better reflect the fact 
that retaliation claims depend on evidence of intent, which should 
not be disregarded at any stage of litigation. 
Still, the Armstrong standard is a demanding one, and crim-
inal defendants have largely been unsuccessful in using direct ev-
idence of unconstitutional intent in the selective prosecution 
arena. Although Armstrong does not require defendants to come 
up with comparison-based evidence if they have direct evidence 
of intent, the Armstrong Court likely did not expect many crimi-
nal defendants to have direct evidence of a prosecutor’s ma-
lintent, presumably because prosecutors are unlikely to air such 
discriminatory intent in public. Regardless of the Armstrong 
Court’s expectations, nothing in the opinion can be read to bar 
direct evidence of intent in disputes that hinge on such a factor.15 
The same reasoning applies in the retaliatory arrest context. For-
tunately, in those cases, allowing litigants to use evidence of 
 
 13 See id at 1724–25 (majority). 
 14 See Wayte v United States, 470 US 598, 608 (1985) (“[T]he decision to prosecute 
may not be deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard.”) (quotation marks omit-
ted). See also Part III.B.2. 
 15 See Armstrong, 517 US at 469 n 3 (reserving the question whether direct evidence 
of intent can be considered in lieu of the similarly-situated-individuals showing). See also 
United States v Al Jibori, 90 F3d 22, 25 (2d Cir 1996) (interpreting Armstrong and noting 
that “admissions [of intent] should sometimes justify further inquiry”). 
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intent is much more likely to make a difference. In retaliatory ar-
rest cases, the defendants are police officers, not prosecutors. Po-
lice officers conduct much of their business on the street, and the 
rise of cellphone videos and “copwatching” efforts have greatly in-
creased the likelihood that direct evidence of retaliatory intent on 
the part of police officers will be at least witnessed, if not captured 
on video. Because direct evidence of intent will be significantly 
easier to obtain in retaliatory arrest scenarios than in selective 
prosecution, the application of Armstrong here is even more ap-
propriate. Though the case has proven to be a hindrance for crim-
inal defendants in its original context, this Comment proposes us-
ing Armstrong in a new, more positive way: to help victims of 
police misconduct. 
Part I briefly explains First Amendment retaliation doctrine, 
the 42 USC § 1983 remedy, and how they interact in retaliation 
claims. Section 1983 serves as a vehicle for enforcing constitu-
tional rights, but subsequent case law has constrained when 
plaintiffs can get recourse for violations. In Nieves, Armstrong, 
and other cases, the Court has restricted civil rights claims, at-
tempting to strike a balance between the need to give victims a 
remedy and concerns about judicial overreach into government 
functions. Shifting to Nieves itself, Part II lays out the majority 
opinion and Justice Gorsuch’s attempt to reconcile it with Arm-
strong. Part III formulates the rule that results from the applica-
tion of Armstrong to retaliatory arrest cases and explains its prac-
tical and doctrinal advantages over the more rigid Nieves rule. 
Finally, Part IV argues that, despite the infamous difficulty of 
meeting the Armstrong standard, using Armstrong in retaliatory 
arrest suits will actually open up opportunities for plaintiffs. 
While Armstrong is a high bar, it provides a crucial third way for 
victims to meet the threshold requirement. Because evidence of 
police intent is more readily available than evidence of prosecuto-
rial discrimination, especially with the increasing cellphone sur-
veillance of officers, retaliatory arrest victims will be able to ac-
tually make use of this third path. 
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I.  BACKGROUND: REDRESS FOR FIRST AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS 
A. The First Amendment Prohibits Retaliatory Actions for 
Protected Speech 
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”16 As Justice Thurgood 
Marshall explained, freedom from state censorship is integral to 
the development of society; it “permit[s] the continued building of 
our politics and culture, and [ ] assure[s] self-fulfillment for each 
individual.”17 In particular, the right to criticize the government 
reflects “the principle that debate on public issues should be un-
inhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include ve-
hement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on 
government and public officials.”18 
Beyond direct restrictions on speech, the First Amendment 
prohibits government officials from taking adverse actions 
against individuals to penalize them for their speech or beliefs.19 
The Court has stated that punishing individuals for engaging in 
protected speech essentially amounts to restricting that speech 
directly.20 Specifically, denying public benefits to those who en-
gage in certain types of speech is prohibited because it “neces-
sarily will have the effect of coercing [them] to refrain from the 
proscribed speech.”21 Importantly, the government cannot deprive 
someone of a benefit because of their protected expression, even 
when there is no legal right to that benefit in the first place.22 For 
 
 16 US Const Amend I. 
 17 Police Department of the City of Chicago v Mosley, 408 US 92, 95–96 (1972). 
 18 New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 270 (1964). In that case, the Court 
protected newspapers against liability for publishing false defamatory statements about 
public officials unless the statements were made with “actual malice.” See id at 279–80 
(quotation marks omitted). See also, for example, De Jonge v Oregon, 299 US 353, 364–66 
(1937) (holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments barred Oregon from prosecut-
ing the defendant for participating in a Communist Party meeting, even though the Party 
advocated overthrowing the government). 
 19 See Crawford-El v Britton, 523 US 574, 592 (1998) (stating that “the First Amend-
ment bars retaliation for protected speech”). 
 20 See Speiser v Randall, 357 US 513, 518 (1958) (“It cannot be gainsaid that a dis-
criminatory [action taken in retaliation] for engaging in speech is a limitation on free 
speech.”). 
 21 Id at 519. 
 22 See Perry v Sindermann, 408 US 593, 597 (1972) (stating that “even though a per-
son has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental benefit . . . there are some reasons upon 
which the government may not rely [in denying that person access to said benefit]”); Sher-
bert v Verner, 374 US 398, 404 (1963) (observing that “[i]t is too late in the day to doubt 
that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of 
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example, in Pickering v Board of Education of Township High 
School District 205,23 the Court found that a public school board 
violated a teacher’s freedom of speech by firing him after he crit-
icized the superintendent in a letter to a local newspaper,24 even 
though there is no right to public employment. Similar claims can 
be brought for the denial of a variety of benefits, including tax 
exemptions25 and unemployment benefits,26 when such denial was 
carried out to penalize someone for exercising their First Amend-
ment rights or to suppress expression. Across these different con-
texts, the operative question is why someone was denied a benefit, 
not whether they were otherwise legally entitled to it. Actions in-
tended to penalize speech may violate the First Amendment, re-
gardless of whether they would have been permissible if taken for 
other reasons.27 
Strategic use of criminal law enforcement to penalize civil-
ians for speaking out also runs afoul of the First Amendment. 
“[T]he law is settled that as a general matter the First Amend-
ment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual 
to retaliatory actions, including criminal prosecutions, for speak-
ing out.”28 Arrests intended to punish someone for speaking out 
can also violate the First Amendment,29 and the Court has 
acknowledged “that some police officers may exploit the arrest 
power as a means of suppressing speech.”30 In City of Houston v 
Hill,31 the Court struck down a city ordinance that made it a crime 
 
conditions upon a benefit or privilege”); Speiser, 357 US at 518 (explaining that “appellees 
are plainly mistaken in their argument that, because a [government benefit] is a ‘privilege’ 
or ‘bounty,’ its denial may not infringe speech”). 
 23 391 US 563 (1968). 
 24 Id at 564–65. 
 25 See Speiser, 357 US at 528–29. 
 26 See Sherbert, 374 US at 404–06 (finding that when “appellant’s declared ineligi-
bility for benefits derives solely from the practice of her religion,” such denial of unemploy-
ment benefits violates the First Amendment). 
 27 See, for example, Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v Doyle, 429 
US 274, 283–84 (1977) (“Even though [the teacher-plaintiff] could have been discharged 
for no reason whatever . . . he may nonetheless establish a claim to reinstatement if the 
decision not to rehire him was made by reason of his exercise of constitutionally protected 
First Amendment freedoms.”) (emphasis added). 
 28 Hartman v Moore, 547 US 250, 256 (2006). 
 29 See, for example, Lozman v City of Riviera Beach, 138 S Ct 1945, 1955 (2018) 
(finding that the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights could have been violated when the 
city allegedly formed an official policy to order his arrest in order to retaliate against him 
for criticizing public officials). 
 30 Id at 1953. 
 31 482 US 451 (1987). 
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to “oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman”32 because it 
afforded officers substantial discretion to arrest people as punish-
ment for protected speech, in violation of the First Amendment.33 
In Hill, the Court noted that freedom from arrest for challenging 
police action “is one of the principal characteristics by which we 
distinguish a free nation from a police state.”34 Since the First 
Amendment prevents government officials from taking adverse 
actions against individuals because of their speech or beliefs, us-
ing criminal law enforcement to punish speakers is unconstitu-
tional. Important to this Comment’s analysis of Nieves, whether 
official action is proper under the First Amendment often hinges 
on the official’s intent, specifically whether the action was taken 
with the motive to penalize protected speech.35 
B. Constitutional Torts Under § 1983 
To redress unconstitutional retaliation by government offi-
cials, individuals can bring lawsuits for so-called constitutional 
torts. While the Constitution guarantees the rights in question, a 
statute establishes the means to remedy violations. In 1871, Con-
gress established 42 USC § 1983, a private right of action allow-
ing individuals to enforce constitutional protections against state 
actors and obtain civil remedies.36 It was not until Monroe v Pape37 
in 1961, when the Court confirmed that individuals could sue 
 
 32 Id at 455, quoting Code of Ordinances, City of Houston § 34-11(a) (1984). 
 33 Hill, 482 US at 466–67. 
 34 Id at 462–63. 
 35 See Mt. Healthy, 429 US at 287 (holding that a plaintiff alleging retaliatory dis-
missal must show that his protected speech was a “motivating factor” in his dismissal) 
(emphasis added); Skoog v County of Clackamas, 469 F3d 1221, 1232 (9th Cir 2006) (re-
quiring retaliatory arrest plaintiffs to “ultimately prove that [the officer’s] desire to cause 
the chilling effect was a but-for cause of the defendant’s action”). See also Hartman, 547 
US at 256 (“Some [unconstitutional] official actions adverse to [ ] a speaker might well be 
unexceptionable if taken on other [nonretaliatory] grounds.”). 
 36 Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat 13, codified as amended at 42 USC § 1983: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured. 
In Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388 
(1971), the Court held that plaintiffs may also bring constitutional claims against federal 
officers in certain contexts. See id at 397. However, in recent years “the Court has made 
clear that expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.” Ziglar v 
Abbasi, 137 S Ct 1843, 1857 (2017), quoting Ashcroft v Iqbal, 556 US 662, 675 (2009). 
 37 365 US 167 (1961). 
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state officials under § 1983, that plaintiffs began regularly using 
the statute.38 
The Supreme Court has explained that courts use common 
law tort principles to circumscribe the contours of § 1983 claims, 
identifying the tort closest to a particular constitutional claim and 
starting with the elements of that tort.39 Common law tort rules 
can constrain civil rights remedies independent of whether a con-
stitutional violation actually occurred, meaning that not every 
right entails a remedy. For example, in Heck v Humphrey,40 the 
Court held that to recover under § 1983 for an unconstitutional 
conviction, the plaintiff must prove that the conviction was re-
versed, expunged, or declared invalid.41 This rule, borrowed from 
the tort of malicious prosecution, prevents litigants from chal-
lenging convictions in parallel litigation.42 Perhaps more im-
portantly, it makes proving the injury was caused by the violation 
more efficient and avoids protracted factual disputes, a common 
concern in civil rights litigation.43 
The affirmative defense of immunity also shields officials 
from § 1983 liability in many cases, even if they violated a plain-
tiff’s rights. Immunity doctrines are rooted in the related ideas 
that excessive litigation disrupts government functions,44 and 
that the public interest is better served when certain officials can 
act with some independence from judicial scrutiny.45 Qualified im-
munity protects officials, often police officers, from civil damages 
liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly estab-
lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
 
 38 See id at 187. For a discussion of Monroe’s implications for § 1983 litigation, see 
Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Is Born: The Interlocking Supreme Court Stories of Tenney 
and Monroe, 17 Lewis & Clark L Rev 1019, 1036–60 (2013). 
 39 See Carey v Piphus, 435 US 247, 257–58 (1978). In Smith v Wade, 461 US 30 
(1983), the Court also recognized that judges can adjust the elements of § 1983 over time 
to align them with the evolving common law. Id at 34 (“In the absence of more specific 
guidance, we looked first to the common law of torts (both modern and as of 1871), with 
such modification or adaptation as might be necessary to carry out the purpose and policy 
of the statute.”). 
 40 512 US 477 (1994). 
 41 See id at 486–87. 
 42 See id at 484–85. 
 43 See, for example, Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1724 (“[I]t is particularly difficult to deter-
mine whether the adverse government action was caused by the officer’s malice.”). 
 44 See Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 818 (1982) (stating that qualified immunity 
doctrine helps to “avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of 
many insubstantial claims on summary judgment”). 
 45 See Pierson v Ray, 386 US 547, 554 (1967) (explaining that judicial immunity is 
“for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to 
exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences”). 
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person would have known.”46 Further, certain officials—including 
judges47 and prosecutors48—are absolutely immune from § 1983 
liability when they act within the scope of their positions. Immun-
ity defenses, especially qualified immunity, are one of the most 
significant constraints on victims’ ability to get redress for viola-
tions of their rights.49 
Because not every constitutional violation entails a remedy, 
it is important to distinguish between the rights established by 
the Bill of Rights and the remedies established by § 1983. For ex-
ample, in Nieves, the outcome did not turn on whether the plain-
tiff’s speech rights were infringed, but whether he could bring a 
lawsuit.50 At the same time, the Court cannot completely ignore 
the “settled and invariable principle, that every right, when with-
held, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.”51 
Victims take little comfort in the acknowledgement that their 
rights were violated if they are unable to obtain relief, and mis-
conduct may not be adequately deterred without enforcement 
mechanisms.52 In civil rights cases, courts consistently struggle 
with balancing the “obvious concerns with the social costs of sub-
jecting public officials to discovery and trial”53 with the fact that, 
“[i]n situations of abuse of office, an action for damages may offer 
the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guaran-
tees.”54 Thus, in crafting rules to govern § 1983, courts must care-
fully balance the interests in administrability and avoiding 
 
 46 See Harlow, 457 US at 818. Despite the referenced policy justifications for quali-
fied immunity doctrine, some scholars have argued it lacks basis in the text and history of 
§ 1983. See, for example, William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 Cal L Rev 
45, 51–77 (2018). 
 47 See Pierson, 386 US at 553–54. 
 48 See Imbler v Pachtman, 424 US 409, 431 (1976). 
 49 See David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and 
Restricted Remedies, 2005 U Ill L Rev 1199, 1217 (“Th[e] [qualified immunity] defense has 
become a primary means of denying damages to individuals who have suffered a violation 
of their constitutional rights.”). 
 50 See Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1721. 
 51 Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803). 
 52 See Rudovsky, 2005 U Ill L Rev at 1202 (cited in note 49). Professor David Rudov-
sky argues that when the Court limits remedies for constitutional violations, it limits the 
rights’ scope because officials “risk little in acting in accordance with the sub-constitutional 
standards that are a byproduct of remedial restrictions.” Id at 1255. See also Daryl J. 
Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 Colum L Rev 857, 911 
(1999) (“[O]ne might doubt the extent to which governmental officials whose behavior is 
governed by constitutional law care much about constitutional rights except as predictors 
of legal risk, which is a function of remedies.”). 
 53 Crawford-El, 523 US at 585. 
 54 Id at 591 (quotation marks omitted), quoting Harlow, 457 US at 814. 
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excessive interference with law enforcement with the need to give 
victims redress.55 
C. Competing Rules for Retaliation Lawsuits: Mt. Healthy and 
Hartman 
The Court created the baseline test for First Amendment re-
taliation claims in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Ed-
ucation v Doyle,56 requiring that a plaintiff prove that his pro-
tected speech was a “motivating factor” in the decision to take 
adverse action against him.57 The plaintiff in Mt. Healthy was a 
public school teacher who was fired after engaging in protected 
speech, including complaining about the school’s dress code policy 
to a local radio station,58 as well as unprotected activity, including 
making obscene gestures at students.59 The Supreme Court re-
jected the district court’s test, which required only that the plain-
tiff’s protected speech “played a substantial part in the decision” 
to terminate him.60 The Court reasoned that this “substantial 
part” test could be met by pointing to some protected speech that 
the firing could be attributed to, even if the plaintiff would have 
been fired anyway.61 Instead, the Court adopted a “burden-shifting 
framework.”62 First, the plaintiff must show that her protected 
speech was a “motivating factor” in the government’s action 
against her.63 If the plaintiff meets this burden, the government 
is liable unless it can show that it would have taken the action 
“even in the absence of the protected conduct” to escape liability.64 
The Court reasoned that this test screens out most frivolous 
claims and streamlines the difficult inquiry into whether an ad-
verse action was solely, partially, or in small part motivated by 
retaliatory animus.65 
 
 55 See Mt. Healthy, 429 US at 287 (“[T]he proper test to apply . . . is one which like-
wise protects against the invasion of constitutional rights without commanding undesira-
ble consequences not necessary to the assurance of those rights.”). 
 56 429 US 274 (1977). 
 57 Id at 287. 
 58 Id at 281–83. 
 59 Id at 281–82. 
 60 Mt. Healthy, 429 US at 284–86. 
 61 See id at 285–86. 
 62 Arielle W. Tolman and David M. Shapiro, From City Council to the Streets: Pro-
testing Police Misconduct After Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 13 Charleston L Rev 49, 
72 (2018). 
 63 Mt. Healthy, 429 US at 287. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See id. 
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Hartman v Moore66 added a threshold burden for retaliatory 
prosecution claims, requiring plaintiffs to show that the prosecu-
tor lacked probable cause.67 The Court reasoned that some retali-
atory prosecution cases involve complex causal chains, and “the 
need to show this more complex connection supports a [threshold 
no-probable-cause] requirement.”68 In a retaliatory prosecution 
action, a plaintiff may not sue the absolutely immune prosecu-
tor,69 so they sue police officers or other officials for unlawfully 
inducing prosecution instead.70 To prevail, a plaintiff must show 
that the official, “bent on retaliation,”71 induced the prosecutor to 
bring charges which she otherwise would not have brought.72 Be-
cause a police officer’s malintent “does not necessarily show that 
the [officer] induced the action of a prosecutor who would not have 
pressed charges otherwise,” the plaintiff must show that the pros-
ecutor did not base her own charging decision on probable cause, 
independent of any police misconduct.73 Further, courts afford 
prosecutors a presumption of regularity and assume that they 
only press charges for lawful reasons.74 Finally, information re-
garding probable cause (or lack thereof) is always available in re-
taliatory prosecution cases and is usually highly evidentiary—if 
not dispositive—of causation.75 Thus, the Court decided that a 
strict no-probable-cause rule should apply without exception.76 
This resolved the circuit split that developed following Mt. 
Healthy, with some circuits requiring plaintiffs alleging retalia-
tory prosecutions to demonstrate a lack of probable cause77 and 
others choosing not to impose this requirement.78 
Because the Hartman Court confined its ruling to retaliatory 
prosecution claims, the circuits subsequently split on whether the 
no-probable-cause rule applied to retaliatory arrests as well. After 
 
 66 547 US 250 (2006). 
 67 See id at 265–66. 
 68 Id at 261. 
 69 See Imbler, 424 US at 424. 
 70 See Hartman, 547 US at 262. 
 71 Id at 265. 
 72 Id at 261–62. 
 73 Id at 263 (emphasis added). 
 74 See Hartman, 547 US at 263. 
 75 See id at 261. 
 76 Id at 265–66 (“[S]howing an absence of probable cause will have high probative 
force, and can be made mandatory with little or no added cost.”). 
 77 See Wood v Kesler, 323 F3d 872, 883 (11th Cir 2003); Keenan v Tejeda, 290 F3d 
252, 260–61 (5th Cir 2002); Mozzochi v Borden, 959 F2d 1174, 1179–80 (2d Cir 1992). 
 78 See Poole v County of Otero, 271 F3d 955, 961 (10th Cir 2001); Haynesworth v 
Miller, 820 F2d 1245, 1256–57 (DC Cir 1987). 
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Hartman, the Eighth79 and Eleventh80 Circuits extended the rule 
to retaliatory arrest claims, requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate, as 
an initial matter, that there was no probable cause to arrest them, 
before addressing questions of retaliatory motivation. In these ju-
risdictions, the presence of arguable probable cause, even for mi-
nor offenses, would defeat retaliatory arrest claims just as it was 
held to defeat retaliatory prosecution claims in Hartman.81 At the 
same time, the Sixth,82 Ninth,83 and Tenth Circuits84 declined to re-
quire plaintiffs to plead the absence of probable cause. In Howards 
v McLaughlin,85 the Tenth Circuit explained that, in its view, the 
causation issues and presumption of regularity that heavily in-
fluenced Hartman do not apply in the arrest context, declining to 
extend Hartman and denying the officers qualified immunity.86 
The Supreme Court then reversed the Tenth Circuit’s denial of 
qualified immunity but did not address whether Hartman’s no-
probable-cause rule in fact applies to arrests.87 
In Lozman v City of Riviera Beach,88 the Court again declined 
to squarely answer the no-probable-cause question, ruling nar-
rowly that lack of probable cause is not required when the plain-
tiff can establish an official policy of retaliation by objective evi-
dence.89 Fane Lozman alleged that municipal leaders created a 
plan to retaliate against him for speaking out against the use of 
eminent domain to seize waterfront where his boat was located, 
and ordered his arrest when he attempted to speak at a city coun-
cil meeting.90 Lozman’s claim survived, despite the existence of 
probable cause to arrest him.91 However, the Court separated Loz-
man’s case from the “typical” retaliatory arrest case because he 
claimed “that the City itself retaliated against him pursuant to 
an ‘official municipal policy’ of intimidation.”92 The Court 
 
 79 See McCabe v Parker, 608 F3d 1068, 1075, 1079 (8th Cir 2010). 
 80 See Phillips v Irvin, 222 F Appx 928, 929 (11th Cir 2007). 
 81 See McCabe, 608 F3d at 1079; Phillips, 222 F Appx at 929. 
 82 See Barnes v Wright, 449 F3d 709, 718–19 (6th Cir 2006). 
 83 See Skoog, 469 F3d at 1232. 
 84 See Howards v McLaughlin, 634 F3d 1131, 1148 (10th Cir 2011). 
 85 634 F3d 1131 (10th Cir 2011). 
 86 See id at 1148. 
 87 See Reichle v Howards, 566 US 658, 668–69 (2012). 
 88 138 S Ct 1945 (2018). 
 89 Id at 1954–55. 
 90 See id at 1949–50. 
 91 See id at 1949, 1955. 
 92 Lozman, 138 S Ct at 1954, quoting Monell v New York City Department of Social 
Services, 436 US 658, 691 (1978). To prevail on a constitutional claim against a 
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specified that this “unique class” of claims required “objective” ev-
idence to survive summary judgment.93 Lozman offered a tran-
script of the meeting in which officials planned his arrest and a 
video recording of the arrest itself.94 The Lozman case carved out 
an exception for a subset of arrests pursuant to official policy of 
retaliation, leaving undefined the rules governing the “mine run 
of arrests.”95 That more consequential ruling would be handed 
down in Nieves. 
II.  NIEVES V BARTLETT: THE “NARROW QUALIFICATION” AND THE 
ARMSTRONG APPROACH 
In May 2019, the Court finally spoke on the application of 
Hartman to typical retaliatory arrest claims. Nieves involves the 
arrest of a winter sports festival attendee after some less-than-
cordial conversations between the attendee and his arresting of-
ficers. In 2014, Russell Bartlett attended the “Arctic Man” festival 
in the Hoodoo Mountains near Paxson, Alaska.96 At around 
1:30 am on the last night of the festival, Sergeant Luis Nieves in-
structed a group of partygoers to move their beer keg inside their 
RV to prevent minors from stealing the beer.97 Nieves testified 
that an intoxicated Bartlett told the RV owners not to speak with 
the officers and shouted at Nieves, while Bartlett denied acting 
belligerently and countered that Nieves in fact acted aggres-
sively.98 Shortly afterward, Bartlett intervened with another of-
ficer who was questioning a teenager about possible underage 
drinking.99 The officer, Trooper Bryce Weight, claimed that Bart-
lett continued behaving aggressively and leaned into him combat-
ively, requiring Weight to push back against Bartlett.100 Bartlett 
claimed that he stood close to Weight to speak over the loud back-
ground music.101 Either way, Nieves immediately came to the 
scene and arrested Bartlett.102 “[W]hen Bartlett was slow to 
 
municipality, plaintiffs must show the existence of an official policy that caused the viola-
tion to occur. See Monell, 436 US at 691. 
 93 Lozman, 138 S Ct at 1954. 
 94 See id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 See Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1720. 
 97 See id. 
 98 See id. 
 99 See id. 
 100 See Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1720–21. 
 101 See id at 1721. 
 102 See id at 1720–21. 
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comply with his orders, the officers forced him to the ground and 
threatened to tase him.”103 According to Bartlett, Nieves said, 
“[B]et you wish you would have talked to me now,” an apparent 
reference to Bartlett’s earlier refusal to cooperate with the offic-
ers’ management of the beer keg scene.104 Bartlett was charged 
with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest, and the charges 
were eventually dismissed.105 
Bartlett brought suit against the officers under § 1983, claim-
ing that they arrested him in retaliation for both his refusal to 
cooperate with the party investigation and his intervention with 
the officers’ questioning of the underage partygoer, in violation of 
the First Amendment.106 The district court dismissed the suit on 
the grounds that the officers had probable cause to arrest Bart-
lett.107 However, the Ninth Circuit reversed, applying its prior de-
cision in Ford v Yakima.108 The Ninth Circuit required that Bart-
lett show that the officers’ conduct would “chill a person of 
ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activity” and 
present evidence that would “enable him ultimately to prove that 
the officers’ desire to chill his speech was a but-for cause of the 
arrest,” eschewing Hartman’s rigid threshold requirement.109 
Bartlett presented only his affidavit alleging that Nieves said, 
“[B]et you wish you would have talked to me now,” but the Ninth 
Circuit determined that it was enough to proceed.110 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether, as 
a threshold matter, plaintiffs must prove lack of probable cause 
for typical retaliatory arrest claims.111 Writing for the Court, 
Chief Justice John Roberts holds that Hartman generally extends 
to retaliatory arrests, requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate lack of 
probable cause before litigating other elements of their claim.112 
The majority’s reasoning hinges on its conclusion that the causal 
complexity of retaliatory prosecution cases also applies to arrests, 
so the same rule should apply as well.113 The source of the 
 
 103 Id at 1721. 
 104 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1721. 
 105 See id. 
 106 See id. 
 107 See id. 
 108 706 F3d 1188 (9th Cir 2013), abrogated by Nieves, 139 S Ct 1715 (2019). 
 109 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1721 (quotation marks omitted). 
 110 See id. 
 111 See id. 
 112 See id at 1723–24. 
 113 See Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1723–24. 
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complexity differs, as there is not usually a chain of multiple ac-
tors in arrest cases.114 However, the majority notes that protected 
speech is often a “wholly legitimate consideration”115 in deciding 
whether to arrest, making it difficult to separate instances of re-
taliation.116 Proving lack of probable cause eliminates the possi-
bility that the officer would have lawfully arrested the plaintiff 
anyway. In addition, the Court identifies false imprisonment and 
malicious prosecution as common law tort analogues to retalia-
tory arrest and came to the same result, as both torts are defeated 
by the existence of probable cause.117 
The threshold requirement prevents courts from “moving di-
rectly to consideration of the subjective intent of the officers,” and 
Fourth Amendment doctrine prohibits these sorts of probes into 
officer motivations.118 Citing Devenpeck v Alford119 and other 
Fourth Amendment cases, the majority explains that a police of-
ficer’s intent is “irrelevant” at the threshold stage.120 The Court 
also cites the practical need to screen out clearly unmeritorious 
claims, noting that the subjective approach would allow dubious 
claims to be litigated based on bare allegations about a police of-
ficer’s state of mind, which could lead to fishing expeditions and 
other discovery abuses.121 
However, the opinion carves out a “narrow qualification” for 
situations in which “officers have probable cause to make arrests, 
but typically exercise their discretion not to do so.”122 The Court 
notes that police officers today can make warrantless arrests 
whenever they have probable cause for even trivial offenses, 
which was not contemplated when § 1983 was passed.123 If the no-
probable-cause rule applied without exception, officers might un-
constitutionally exploit the criminal code to make arrests for 
 
 114 See id at 1724 (noting that retaliatory prosecution and retaliatory arrest claims 
“give rise to complex causal inquiries for somewhat different reasons”). 
 115 Id (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted), quoting Reichle, 566 US at 668. 
 116 See Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1723–24. For example, a police officer might lawfully con-
sider a suspect’s utterances in his decision to arrest if those utterances give the officer 
reason to believe the suspect is dangerous. See id at 1724. This situation is distinct from 
an unlawful arrest based on the desire to punish the suspect for his speech. In both cases, 
the arrest is caused by the speech in some sense. 
 117 See id at 1726–27. 
 118 Id at 1724. 
 119 543 US 146 (2004). 
 120 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1725 (quotation marks omitted), quoting Devenpeck, 543 US at 153. 
 121 See Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1725. 
 122 Id at 1727. 
 123 See id. 
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offenses that they would otherwise overlook. For example, while 
jaywalking is illegal, officers generally do not make jaywalking 
arrests, so “probable cause does little to prove or disprove the 
causal connection between animus and injury.”124 However, the 
exception applies only “when a plaintiff presents objective evi-
dence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated in-
dividuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had 
not been.”125 According to the Court, the objectivity requirement 
“avoids the significant problems that would arise from reviewing 
police conduct under a purely subjective standard,” returning to 
Devenpeck.126 
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Gorsuch 
suggests that courts should determine the contours of retaliatory 
arrest actions by analogy to racially selective law enforcement, 
rather than false imprisonment, which he believes would slightly 
liberalize the rule.127 He emphasizes that the question addressed 
in Nieves is not the scope of First Amendment rights, but rather 
the scope of redress under § 1983, which is shaped by common-
law torts.128 Justice Gorsuch disagrees with the majority’s conclu-
sion that false imprisonment was the appropriate tort analogue 
in this case.129 He argues that false imprisonment correlates to 
the Fourth Amendment because warrantless arrests made with-
out probable cause give rise to both common law false arrest torts 
and unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment.130 In 
both contexts, the question is whether the arrest was made with-
out legal authority.131 In contrast, the First Amendment prohibits 
officers from “abus[ing] their authority by making an otherwise 
lawful arrest for an unconstitutional reason,” namely, to silence 
speech.132 The fact that probable cause defeats false imprisonment 
claims, essentially Fourth Amendment claims, should not control 
First Amendment cases like Nieves.133 Justice Gorsuch identifies 
claims for racially selective detention as a better analogy because 
 
 124 Id. 
 125 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1727. 
 126 Id. 
 127 See id at 1731, 1733 (Gorsuch concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 128 See id at 1730–31. 
 129 See Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1731 (Gorsuch concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 130 See id. 
 131 See id. 
 132 Id (second emphasis added). 
 133 See Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1732 (Gorsuch concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“We thus have no legitimate basis for engrafting a no-probable-cause requirement onto a 
First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim.”). 
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it prohibits otherwise lawful actions taken for unlawful reasons; 
he notes that “[e]veryone accepts that a detention based on race, 
even one otherwise authorized by law, violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.”134 
Justice Gorsuch continues the comparison to equal protection 
jurisprudence by likening the majority’s exception to the thresh-
old to obtain discovery on the defense of racially selective prose-
cution established in Armstrong.135 Under Armstrong, when prob-
able cause exists to prosecute, defendants must show that the 
government “declined to prosecute similarly situated suspects of 
other races” to obtain discovery related to selective prosecution.136 
However, according to Armstrong’s footnote three, if a defendant 
can present direct evidence of discriminatory intent in the form 
of admissions, comparison-based evidence might not be re-
quired.137 Since the Nieves majority cites only to Armstrong in ex-
plaining its own similarly-situated-individuals standard,138 Jus-
tice Gorsuch concludes that the Court did not adopt a rigid rule 
requiring comparison-based evidence in every case and expresses 
hope that lower courts will apply the exception “commonsensi-
cally” by considering direct evidence of unconstitutional motive in 
certain circumstances.139 
In dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor shares Justice Gorsuch’s 
concerns but disagrees with his conclusion that the majority’s 
narrow qualification can be read to encompass the flexibility for 
which Justice Gorsuch advocates. She interprets the rule as re-
quiring comparison-based evidence in every case, although she 
notes that the standard is “far from clear.”140 In her view, the new 
rule prevents plaintiffs from using even “unassailable proof of an 
 
 134 Id at 1731 (emphasis in original). 
 135 See id at 1733. See also Armstrong, 517 US at 458. 
 136 Armstrong, 517 US at 458. 
 137 See Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1733 (Gorsuch concurring in part and dissenting in part), 
citing Armstrong, 517 US at 469 n 3. 
 138 See Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1727 (identifying Armstrong as a point of comparison in 
its discussion of the similarly-situated-individuals standard). Justice Gorsuch also noted 
that the separation of powers concern that influenced Armstrong—that courts should not 
meddle in the decision-making of executive branch officials—are relevant to retaliatory 
arrest claims. Id at 1733 (Gorsuch concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also 
Armstrong, 517 US at 464 (“[S]elective-prosecution claim[s] ask[ ] a court to exercise judi-
cial power over a ‘special province’ of the Executive. . . . ‘[T]he presumption of regularity 
supports’ their prosecutorial decisions and, ‘in the absence of clear evidence to the con-
trary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties.’”). 
 139 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1734 (Gorsuch concurring in part and dissenting in part), quot-
ing id at 1741 (Sotomayor dissenting). 
 140 Id at 1736, 1740–41 (Sotomayor dissenting). 
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officer’s unconstitutional statements and motivations,”141 in con-
trast to Justice Gorsuch’s view that Nieves can be read to allow 
plaintiffs to use this type of evidence at the threshold level.142 De-
spite their disagreements, both Justices warn that an ultrastrict 
reading of Nieves will underdeter police misconduct and prevent 
redress of legitimate grievances.143 
Although Nieves concluded years of uncertainty about 
whether the no-probable-cause rule applies to retaliatory arrest 
claims, the majority’s rule seems both overly rigid and somewhat 
ambiguous, as Justices Gorsuch and Sotomayor make clear in 
their opinions. The holding requires plaintiffs to provide some 
sort of objective evidence at the threshold level: they must show 
either that they were arrested without probable cause or that sim-
ilarly situated individuals were not arrested.144 Recognizing that 
a straightforward application of Hartman’s no-probable-cause 
rule would block many valid claims, the majority creates an alter-
native route: a plaintiff could meet the threshold by providing ev-
idence that similarly situated individuals were not arrested. 
However, Nieves prohibits courts from considering direct evidence 
of intent at this stage in litigation, despite the fact that unconsti-
tutional motives are at the core of retaliatory arrest claims. In his 
opinion, Justice Gorsuch draws comparisons to selective prosecu-
tion, tentatively suggesting that Armstrong’s discovery require-
ments, which are demanding but more flexible than the Nieves 
majority’s, are a better doctrinal fit for retaliatory arrest cases.145 
While Justice Gorsuch does not elaborate on Armstrong’s ap-
plication in this context,146 I argue that Armstrong could rescue 
many retaliatory arrest cases from dismissal by giving victims a 
chance to use potentially probative evidence of intent at the be-
ginning of litigation. 
 
 141 Id at 1736 (quotation marks omitted). 
 142 See id at 1734 (Gorsuch concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 143 See Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1732 (Gorsuch concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“But [an] absolute rule doesn’t wash with common experience. . . . [T]he presence of prob-
able cause does not necessarily negate the possibility that an arrest was caused by unlaw-
ful First Amendment retaliation.”); id at 1740 (Sotomayor dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s 
approach will yield arbitrary results and shield willful misconduct from accountability.”). 
 144 See id at 1727 (majority). 
 145 See id at 1733–34 (Gorsuch concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 146 See id. 
2240 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:2029 
 
III.  ARMSTRONG AND THE “NARROW QUALIFICATION”: A 
“COMMONSENSICAL” APPROACH 
In the aftermath of Nieves, a retaliatory arrest victim’s pri-
mary route to obtain redress is to prove a lack of probable cause. 
There are good reasons to think that this rule will practically 
eliminate the damages remedy for retaliation by police officers, 
effectively giving them a pass for First Amendment violations.147 
Police officers have discretion to make arrests for very minor of-
fenses.148 Combined with the fact that “criminal laws have grown 
[ ] exuberantly and come to cover so much previously innocent 
conduct,” today’s officers have expansive power to arrest. 149 As 
Justice Gorsuch notes, “almost anyone can be arrested for some-
thing.”150 If the presence of probable cause for any offense is 
enough to immunize officers from liability, they may abuse their 
arrest power without consequences. 
The Nieves majority acknowledges this reality by carving 
out the “narrow qualification.”151 However, because providing 
comparison-based evidence is the only method to reach the 
threshold burden,152 many victims will still be out of luck because 
this type of evidence is extremely difficult to obtain, if it exists at 
 
 147 See Garrett Epps, John Roberts Strikes a Blow Against Free Speech (The Atlantic, 
June 3, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/X4T8-NU8E (arguing that Nieves “will make it 
harder to hold officers to account when they . . . arrest citizens in retaliation for speech 
they don’t like”); Brian Frazelle, The Supreme Court Just Made It Easier for Police to Ar-
rest You for Filming Them (Slate, May 31, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/S5YM-J9TL 
(arguing that, “[b]y enabling police officers to target viewpoints they dislike with near 
impunity, [Nieves] could be catastrophic for protesters and the press”). 
 148 See Atwater v City of Lago Vista, 532 US 318, 344–45 (2001). 
 149 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1730 (Gorsuch concurring in part and dissenting in part). See 
also Marc A. Levin, At the State Level, So-Called Crimes Are Here, There, Everywhere, 28 
Crim Just 4, 6 (2013) (highlighting how “the deluge of overly broad and vague criminal 
laws gives police and prosecutors virtually untrammeled authority to arrest and indict 
anyone”). 
 150 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1730 (Gorsuch concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 151 See id at 1727 (majority) (“[A]n unyielding requirement to show the absence of 
probable cause could pose ‘a risk that some police officers may exploit the arrest power as 
a means of suppressing speech.’”), quoting Lozman, 138 S Ct at 1953–54. 
 152 See Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1727. The majority does not clearly indicate whether, for 
the exception to apply, the crime of arrest must be in a particular category of minor crimes, 
or if the primary inquiry is whether similarly situated people were not (or possibly would 
not have been) arrested. For example, if a plaintiff were arrested for jaywalking, would 
they have to provide any evidence that people are generally not arrested for jaywalking? 
The majority indicates that this situation self-evidently falls into the exception. Id. As 
Justice Sotomayor points out, “[i]t is hard to see what point is served by requiring a jour-
nalist arrested for jaywalking to point to specific other jaywalkers who got a free pass.” Id 
at 1741 (Sotomayor dissenting). 
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all. Nieves requires plaintiffs to provide evidence of arrests that 
were not made. Unless police officers take notice of and document 
each circumstance in which they have probable cause to make an 
arrest but choose not to—an unlikely situation—it is hard to see 
how plaintiffs would be able to make this showing.153 As Justice 
Sotomayor explains, “while records of arrests and prosecutions 
can be hard to obtain, it will be harder still to identify arrests that 
never happened.”154 Thus, for many victims with legitimate griev-
ances, proving lack of probable cause will not be viable, and the 
majority’s exception will not save them. 
Nieves’s requirement that the threshold inquiry be “objec-
tive”155 is not just unduly limiting to victims, it muddles the 
Court’s unconstitutional-intent jurisprudence. Objective evidence 
rules make sense in the Fourth Amendment context, but retalia-
tion claims do not depend on Fourth Amendment reasonableness. 
Retaliation hinges on the defendant’s intent to suppress or punish 
speech, not whether his actions were otherwise lawful.156 So while 
the majority is correct that intent is irrelevant to Fourth Amend-
ment claims against police officers, in claims based on unconsti-
tutional intent—like retaliation and discrimination—evidence of 
intent is always relevant. In cases like Nieves, courts should con-
sider evidence of intent at the threshold level when it is available. 
Although Armstrong crafted a comparison-based evidence re-
quirement similar to the Nieves majority’s rule, it does not pre-
clude litigants from using direct evidence of motive to meet the 
 
 153 See Alison Siegler and William Admussen, Discovering Racial Discrimination by 
the Police, 115 Nw U L Rev *36–37 (forthcoming 2020), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=3548829 (Perma archive unavailable) (noting that in selective enforcement cases, “it is 
impossible to identify a particular [ ] individual whom the police did not target or investi-
gate, because it is impossible to prove a negative”) (emphasis in original). See also Richard 
H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 
Chi Kent L Rev 605, 617–18 (1998) (discussing that in the selective prosecution context, 
“[w]hen [ ] the defendants complain that similarly situated Whites are not arrested or 
prosecuted at all, there will be no records to find to meet the similarly situated require-
ment”) (emphasis in original). 
 154 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1740 (Sotomayor dissenting). In contrast, clear evidence of 
malintent is becoming more available in the form of recordings from cellphones and secu-
rity cameras, as is elaborated in Part IV. See also id at 1739 (describing the increasing 
availability of “audiovisual record[s] of key events” in police-citizen interactions). 
 155 Id at 1727 (majority) (“[L]ike a probable cause analysis, [the narrow qualification] 
provides an objective inquiry.”). 
 156 See Crawford-El v Britton, 523 US 574, 584 (1998) (referring to retaliation as a 
claim for which “entitlement to relief depends on proof of an improper motive”) (emphasis 
added). See also note 35 and accompanying text. 
2242 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:2029 
 
threshold burden.157 While Armstrong set out to create “a signifi-
cant barrier to the litigation of insubstantial claims,”158 the opin-
ion did not go as far as requiring courts to disregard evidence of 
prosecutorial intent at the threshold level.159 Because the claim in 
Armstrong, like the claim in Nieves, is one that hinges on official 
intent, not Fourth Amendment reasonableness, the opinion 
leaves the door open for defendants to present evidence of intent 
right away if they have it. The Armstrong Court established a 
preliminary requirement against the background that defendants 
will almost never be able to present direct evidence of prosecuto-
rial motive. Indeed, post-Armstrong, few criminal defendants 
have been able to obtain discovery on selective prosecution claims 
with evidence of prosecutorial intent alone.160 Instances in which 
a prosecutor admits their unconstitutional intent in choosing to 
prosecute are few and far between.161 
Clear evidence of a police officer’s intent, on the other hand, is 
much easier to obtain,162 so retaliatory arrest plaintiffs will have 
more luck with Armstrong than criminal defendants alleging selec-
tive prosecution. This Part argues that Nieves’s objective evidence 
requirement contradicts precedent and that the Armstrong stand-
ard should govern the exception to the no-probable-cause rule. Arm-
strong more accurately represents the Court’s unconstitutional-
intent jurisprudence and avoids (at least some of) Nieves’s harsh 
results for plaintiffs.163 I then explain that litigants are empow-
ered to use evidence of motive at the threshold level pursuant to 
Armstrong’s footnote three, despite the scarcity of case law. 
 
 157 See McAdams, 73 Chi Kent L Rev at 612 n 37 (cited in note 153) (discussing Arm-
strong’s footnote three, in which “[t]he Court notes there is one possible exception to its 
holding”). 
 158 Armstrong, 517 US at 464. 
 159 See id at 469 n 3. 
 160 For an example of a court allowing discovery on a selective prosecution claim by 
virtue of evidence of intent alone under footnote three, see United States v Al Jibori, 90 
F3d 22, 25 (2d Cir 1996) (“The Supreme Court in Armstrong reserved the question whether 
a defendant must satisfy the similarly situated requirement in those circumstances [when 
evidence of prosecutorial intent exists]. We believe this case demonstrates why admissions 
should sometimes justify further inquiry.”) (citation omitted). Al Jibori is discussed fur-
ther in Part III.C.3. 
 161 See McAdams, 73 Chi Kent L Rev at 623 (cited in note 153) (noting that in Al 
Jibori, in which the prosecutor admitted that the decision to prosecute was partially based 
on ethnicity or nationality, “the government made a tactical error . . . that it is not likely 
to repeat”). 
 162 See Part IV. 
 163 Though Armstrong was written to govern a distinct area of law, Part III.C.1 ex-
plains that the rule is workable in the retaliatory arrest context. 
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A. Rejecting Nieves to Avoid a “Constitutional Frankenstein” 
While Nieves purports to clear up the retaliatory arrest 
standard, the narrow qualification’s comparison-based evidence 
requirement contradicts precedent. Specifically, applying an ob-
jective evidence rule in this context is inconsistent with the 
Court’s unconstitutional-motive jurisprudence. While the Fourth 
Amendment is solely concerned with objective evidence, requiring 
it in First Amendment retaliation cases results in, as Justice So-
tomayor puts it, “a Frankenstein-like constitutional tort that may 
do more harm than good.”164 
Under a straightforward reading of Nieves, plaintiffs are pro-
hibited from using direct evidence of retaliatory intent in lieu of 
“objective,” comparison-based evidence.165 In particular, the Court 
notes that, “[b]ecause this inquiry is objective, the statements and 
motivations of the particular arresting officer are ‘irrelevant’ at 
this stage.”166 The Court rejects the Ninth Circuit’s approach, 
which considered Bartlett’s affidavit of Officer Nieves’s statement 
to be sufficient.167 
To craft this rule, the Court improperly applies Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, in which an official’s subjective intent has 
no bearing on liability, to First Amendment retaliation claims, 
which ultimately depend on subjective intent and thus require 
consideration of intent throughout. The text of the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits only unreasonable conduct,168 so an officer’s 
 
 164 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1738 (Sotomayor dissenting). 
 165 Id at 1727 (majority). 
 166 Id, quoting Devenpeck, 543 US at 153. 
 167 See Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1727–28. However, as Justice Sotomayor points out, it is 
not clear whether the majority actually prohibits consideration of any officer statements: 
It is also unclear what the majority means when it says that because its thresh-
old “inquiry is objective, the statements and motivations of the particular arrest-
ing officer are ‘irrelevant.’” That could conceivably be read to mean that all state-
ments are irrelevant, even objectively probative statements describing events in 
the world—e.g., “I am arresting the libertarians, but not the nonlibertarian pro-
testers who were also trespassing.” The facts asserted therein—that libertarians 
were arrested, nonlibertarians were not, and all were similarly trespassing—are 
precisely the kind of objective evidence the Court seeks. . . . More likely, [ ] the 
majority means only that statements describing the officer’s internal thought 
processes are irrelevant (e.g., “I hate libertarians”). But many statements will 
fall somewhere in between (e.g., “I’m only arresting you because I hate libertar-
ians”).  
Id at 1741 n 7 (Sotomayor dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 168 See US Const Amend IV (“The right of the people to be secure . . . against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”). 
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state of mind does not bear on the analysis.169 In contrast, the 
First Amendment does not mention reasonableness,170 and moti-
vation matters. As noted in Part I.A, depriving someone of a ben-
efit in order to punish or suppress their speech, even when there 
is no right to the benefit in the first place, violates the First 
Amendment.171 In these instances, the relevant question is not 
whether the sanction was objectively lawful, but whether it was 
imposed for an unconstitutional reason. 
More specifically, the case law the majority cites to justify the 
“objective inquiry” rule does not support importing the rule to 
First Amendment retaliatory arrest litigation. In particular, the 
majority cites Devenpeck,172 in which the Court held that a police 
officer’s state of mind is “irrelevant” to whether a Fourth Amend-
ment violation occurred, the analysis of which is based on objec-
tive reasonableness.173 In support, the Devenpeck Court cited to 
Whren v United States,174 decided eight years earlier, in which the 
majority explained that “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in or-
dinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”175 In 
Whren, the Court considered whether a police officer violates the 
Fourth Amendment by stopping a motorist when there is proba-
ble cause to believe the driver committed a traffic violation, but 
the stop may have been motivated by the driver’s race, not the 
traffic violation.176 Because the plaintiffs challenged the stop on 
Fourth Amendment grounds, they were unsuccessful,177 but Whren 
explicitly distinguished between Fourth Amendment analysis and 
other constitutional claims, like equal protection violations, to 
which the “actual motivations” of the officers are relevant.178 Since 
 
 169 See Devenpeck, 543 US at 153. 
 170 See US Const Amend I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press.”). 
 171 See Part I.A. 
 172 See Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1727. 
 173 See Devenpeck, 543 US at 153, citing Whren v United States, 517 US 806, 812–
13 (1996). 
 174 517 US 806 (1996). 
 175 Id at 813. 
 176 See id at 808–10. 
 177 See id at 819. 
 178 Whren, 517 US at 813 (“We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution 
prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. But the 
constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the 
Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.”). See also United States v Avery, 
137 F3d 343, 352 (6th Cir 1997) (“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment provides citizens a degree of protection independent of the Fourth Amendment pro-
tection against unreasonable searches and seizures.”). 
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retaliatory arrest claims necessarily involve the motivation of the 
defendant officer, Whren prevents courts from importing a full-
throated Fourth Amendment rule to First Amendment retaliation 
claims and disregarding evidence of intent, even at an early stage 
of litigation. 
The Nieves majority cites several other Fourth Amendment 
cases addressing how the Court generally analyzes police con-
duct,179 seeming to say that Fourth Amendment rules apply here 
merely because retaliatory arrests involve police officers. For ex-
ample, the majority notes that “[p]olice officers conduct approxi-
mately 29,000 arrests every day—a dangerous task that requires 
making quick decisions. . . . To ensure that officers may go about 
their work without undue apprehension of being sued, we gener-
ally review their conduct under objective standards of reasonable-
ness.”180 While perhaps it is intuitive that similar rules should ap-
ply to police liability across the board, the Court disregards the 
fact that retaliation allegations are not judged according to rea-
sonableness and makes no attempt to explain why the cited 
Fourth Amendment case law applies in police suits not involving 
the Fourth Amendment.181 
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts’s concern that considering in-
tent at the outset would “compromise evenhanded application of 
the law by making the constitutionality of an arrest ‘vary from 
place to place and from time to time’ depending on the personal 
motives of individual officers” is irrelevant for purposes of the 
First Amendment.182 Again, since First Amendment violations do 
not rise and fall with Fourth Amendment reasonableness and in-
stead actually depend on “personal motives of individual offic-
ers,”183 this sort of variation is appropriate—or even required—in 
the retaliatory arrest context. The retaliatory arrest action loses 
all meaning if two otherwise similar arrests, one motivated by re-
taliatory malice, the other not, have the same result under the 
First Amendment. As noted in Hartman, “[s]ome official 
 
 179 See Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1724 (“[W]e have almost uniformly rejected invitations to 
probe subjective intent.”) (quotation marks omitted), quoting Ashcroft v al-Kidd, 563 US 
731, 737 (2011); Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1724–25 (“Legal tests based on reasonableness are 
generally objective, and this Court has long taken the view that evenhanded law enforce-
ment is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct.”) (quotation 
marks omitted), quoting Kentucky v King, 563 US 452, 464 (2011). 
 180 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1725. 
 181 See text accompanying notes 242–43. 
 182 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1725, quoting Devenpeck, 543 US at 154. 
 183 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1725. 
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[retaliatory] actions adverse to such a speaker might well be un-
exceptionable if taken on other grounds.”184 The Court has previ-
ously rejected the notion that “conduct [that] is objectively valid, 
regardless of improper intent” should be immune from chal-
lenge,185 even though doing so would create more consistent 
standards for official conduct. By ruling that statements of intent 
are irrelevant as a threshold matter, the majority commits “mix-
and-match”186 constitutional reasoning, using rules tailored to 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiries and applying them 
to cases in which intent is the most important element. 
B. Applying Armstrong to Nieves-Style Claims 
In his Nieves opinion, Justice Gorsuch tentatively proposes 
applying Armstrong’s selective prosecution framework to First 
Amendment retaliatory arrests.187 He points out that Armstrong 
does not preclude litigants from using direct evidence of unconsti-
tutional motivation, in lieu of comparison-based evidence, to meet 
the threshold.188 According to Justice Gorsuch, the Nieves major-
ity “seems to indicate that something like Armstrong’s standard 
might govern a retaliatory arrest claim when probable cause ex-
ists to support an arrest”189 and he advocates for lower courts to 
apply Nieves “commonsensically,” consistent with Armstrong.190 
However, this hopeful vision is contradicted by the majority’s 
rigid assertion that “statements and motivations of the particular 
arresting officer are ‘irrelevant’ at this stage.”191 Unlike Arm-
strong, the Nieves majority opinion contains no reservation for 
cases “involving direct admissions”192 of intent. Although Justice 
Gorsuch’s assessment is inconsistent with the language of the 
Nieves majority, his suggestion to use Armstrong in the retalia-
tory arrest context represents a marked doctrinal improvement 
 
 184 Hartman, 547 US at 256. 
 185 Crawford-El, 523 US at 593–94 (quotation marks omitted). 
 186 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1738 (Sotomayor dissenting). 
 187 See id at 1733–34 (Gorsuch concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 188 See id at 1733 (“[A] plaintiff generally must produce evidence that the prosecutor 
failed to charge other similarly situated persons. . . . [H]owever, the Court also suggested 
that equally clear evidence in the form of ‘direct admissions by prosecutors of discrimina-
tory purpose’ might be enough to allow a claim to proceed.”), quoting Armstrong, 517 US 
at 469 n 3. 
 189 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1733 (Gorsuch concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 190 Id at 1734, quoting id at 1741 (Sotomayor dissenting). 
 191 Id at 1727 (majority), quoting Devenpeck, 543 US at 153. See also Part III.A. 
 192 Armstrong, 517 US at 469 n 3. 
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from Nieves and sensibly allows plaintiffs to use relevant and pro-
bative evidence of intent at the onset of litigation. 
1. The Armstrong discovery burden. 
In Armstrong, the Court established the standard to proceed 
to discovery on claims of racially selective prosecution in a crimi-
nal matter.193 The Armstrong defendants, who were Black, were 
indicted on various charges related to crack cocaine distribution, 
as well as federal firearm offenses; in defense, they argued that 
the prosecution against them was racially discriminatory and 
moved for discovery related to that defense.194 First, the Court 
identified the elements of selective prosecution claims, noting 
that they are difficult to prove. The Court explained that, when a 
prosecutor has probable cause, “the decision whether or not to 
prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, 
generally rests entirely in [their] discretion.”195 To rebut the pre-
sumption that the prosecutor acted appropriately within their 
discretion, “a criminal defendant must present ‘clear evidence to 
the contrary.’”196 Since prosecutors are afforded a presumption of 
regularity in their duties as agents of the executive, courts should 
not overstep by questioning prosecutors’ decisions without clear 
evidence of misconduct.197 
The Court then turned to the discovery standard: defendants 
must present “‘some evidence tending to show the existence of the 
essential elements of the defense,’ discriminatory effect and dis-
criminatory intent.”198 Describing the standard as “rigorous,”199 
the Court clarified that to demonstrate discriminatory effect, de-
fendants must show that “similarly situated defendants of other 
races” were not prosecuted.200 However, Armstrong left open 
whether comparison-based evidence of discriminatory effect 
 
 193 See id at 468. 
 194 See id at 458–59. 
 195 Id at 464, quoting Bordenkircher v Hayes, 434 US 357, 364 (1978). 
 196 Armstrong, 517 US at 465 (quotation marks omitted), quoting United States v 
Chemical Foundation, Inc, 272 US 1, 14–15 (1926). 
 197 See Armstrong, 517 US at 464. See also Wayte v United States, 470 US 598, 607 
(1985) (“Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence 
value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Govern-
ment’s overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the 
courts are competent to undertake.”). 
 198 Armstrong, 517 US at 468, quoting United States v Berrios, 501 F2d 1207, 1211 
(2d Cir 1974). 
 199 Armstrong, 517 US at 468. 
 200 Id at 469. 
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would be required in every case. As Justice Gorsuch notes in his 
Nieves opinion, in Armstrong’s footnote three, the Court expressly 
reserved the question of “whether a defendant must satisfy the 
similarly situated requirement in a case involving direct admis-
sions by [prosecutors] of discriminatory purpose.”201 While the 
Court did not explicitly address the standard for demonstrating a 
prosecutor’s discriminatory intent, it acknowledged that, if a 
prosecutor admits unconstitutional purpose, additional threshold 
showings may be unnecessary. 
To attempt to meet the discovery burden,202 the defendants in 
Armstrong offered the affidavit of a public defense paralegal al-
leging that, in 1991, all twenty-four defendants prosecuted for 
dealing crack cocaine in the jurisdiction were Black.203 The Court 
held that this evidence did not meet the discovery threshold re-
quirement because the defendants could not identify any simi-
larly situated, non-Black individuals who “could have been prose-
cuted . . . but were not.”204 The defendants offered no evidence of 
discriminatory purpose, so the Court did not address how that ev-
idence would have impacted the outcome. 
2. How Armstrong would change retaliatory arrest 
litigation (for the better). 
If courts applied an Armstrong-like rule to retaliatory arrest 
cases, plaintiffs could meet the threshold requirement by showing 
(1) a lack of probable cause for their arrests, (2) that similarly sit-
uated individuals not engaging in protected speech were not ar-
rested, or (3) the police officer’s unconstitutional intent in the 
form of admissions. The addition of this important third path di-
verges from Nieves’s holding, which more severely constrains 
plaintiffs and requires courts to disregard probative evidence of 
misconduct at the threshold level.205 
 
 201 Id at 469 n 3 (quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). 
 202 Armstrong identified a discovery burden, which is a threshold rule, so defendants 
must meet the standard before proceeding to discovery. Similarly, the rule in Nieves re-
quires plaintiffs to meet the standard upon a motion for summary judgment. If the gov-
ernment moves for summary judgment in a retaliatory arrest case, the plaintiff must show 
they have met the threshold requirements to avoid having his case dismissed. 
 203 See Armstrong, 517 US at 459. 
 204 Id at 470 (emphasis added). 
 205 See Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1739–40 (Sotomayor dissenting) (“The majority appears 
ready to forsake this body of probative evidence, even though it has the potential to narrow 
factual disputes and avert trials.”). 
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In addition to providing more opportunities for plaintiffs, 
Armstrong more accurately captures the Court’s rulings in  
unconstitutional-intent cases against law enforcement officers. It 
is helpful to separate constitutional claims based on whether the 
defendant’s conduct was reasonable and those based on the de-
fendant’s intent or motive. In contrast to Fourth Amendment 
claims,206 cases involving both racial discrimination and retalia-
tion explicitly presume that a plaintiff can have a valid claim even 
when the action taken against them was objectively reasonable if 
it was taken for an unconstitutional reason.207 In cases of racially 
biased law enforcement, the issue is “intentionally discriminatory 
application of laws” based on race.208 For retaliatory enforcement, 
the court asks whether the decision to arrest was based on a “for-
bidden motive”—to punish protected speech.209 As Justice So-
tomayor notes in her Nieves dissent, “First Amendment retaliation 
claims and equal protection claims are indistinguishable” in the 
sense that they “both inherently require inquiry into ‘an official’s 
motive.’”210 As the Court has noted, constitutional claims based on 
motive—like discrimination and retaliation—are considered to be 
in the same “category.”211 
Because both selective prosecution and retaliation claims de-
pend on intent, Armstrong’s approach is a better doctrinal fit for 
retaliatory arrest litigation than Nieves’s rule. The Armstrong ap-
proach may allow litigants to use evidence of intent to make a 
threshold showing: in footnote three, the opinion recognizes that 
if a litigant can provide direct evidence of intent, the similarly-
situated-individuals showing may not be necessary. In this sce-
nario, the litigant would have already demonstrated that the 
 
 206 See Part III.A. 
 207 See Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1727 (noting that violations may occur in “circumstances 
where officers have probable cause to make arrests, but typically exercise their discretion 
not to do so”) (emphasis added); Armstrong, 517 US at 464 (acknowledging that an other-
wise reasonable decision to prosecute is unconstitutional if it is based on “an unjustifiable 
standard”) (quotation marks omitted), quoting Oyler v Boles, 368 US 448, 456 (1962). 
 208 Whren, 517 US at 813 (emphasis added). 
 209 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1722. 
 210 Id at 1738 (Sotomayor dissenting), quoting Crawford-El, 523 US at 585. 
 211 Crawford-El, 523 US at 585 (considering claims based on unconstitutional motive 
to be a “category of claims”). In fact, selective prosecution jurisprudence encompasses 
claims based on First Amendment retaliation, in addition to racial and other forms of dis-
crimination prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. See, for example, Wayte, 470 US 
at 604 (“Petitioner moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground of selective prosecution. 
He contended that he . . . had been impermissibly targeted . . . for prosecution on the basis 
of [his] exercise of First Amendment rights.”). For further discussion of this point, see 
Part III.C.1. 
2250 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:2029 
 
government official acted for unconstitutional reasons, which is 
the essence of the motive-based claim. The Armstrong standard 
reflects the importance of intent to the claim at issue by acknowl-
edging that, while some significant threshold showing may be 
necessary to weed out frivolous claims, that showing may be 
based on direct evidence of intent. As explained in Part I.A, retal-
iation claims similarly depend on unconstitutional intent, not ob-
jective reasonableness. Thus, a standard which allows litigants to 
make a showing of intent at the threshold level should be applied 
in retaliatory arrest cases, and Nieves’s mandate to ignore evi-
dence of intent unless the plaintiff can produce comparison-based 
evidence must be rejected. 
At the same time, the Court’s unconstitutional-motive cases 
involving law enforcement, including Armstrong, are sensitive to 
the countervailing interest in screening out frivolous claims.212 As 
articulated by Judge Learned Hand, to devise rules for constitu-
tional torts involving intent, the Court attempts to strike a “bal-
ance between the evils inevitable in either alternative,” which 
means taking care not to “submit all officials, the innocent as well 
as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger 
of its outcome.”213 In Armstrong, the Court specified that the 
threshold must be a “significant barrier to the litigation of insub-
stantial claims.”214 
To be consistent with this language, retaliatory arrest plain-
tiffs seeking to use evidence of motive at the threshold level 
should be required to provide credible evidence that is unlikely to 
lead to protracted factual disputes. For example, plaintiffs might 
offer video or audio recordings of their arrests or interactions with 
their arresting officer or corroborating witness affidavits alleging 
the officer’s statements. The Court has been willing to consider 
this type of evidence even in circumstances when it is particularly 
concerned about screening out frivolous claims. For example, in 
Lozman, the Court considered a transcript of the meeting in 
which officials planned his arrest and a video recording of the ar-
rest itself to be “objective evidence of a policy motivated by retal-
iation.”215 Thus, the Court allowed Lozman to maintain his 
 
 212 As some have argued, too sensitive, as discussed in Part IV. See Armstrong, 517 
US at 464 (“[T]he showing necessary to obtain discovery should itself be a significant bar-
rier to the litigation of insubstantial claims.”). 
 213 Gregoire v Biddle, 177 F2d 579, 581 (2d Cir 1949). 
 214 Armstrong, 517 US at 464. 
 215 Lozman, 138 S Ct at 1954. 
2020] A (Very) Unlikely Hero 2251 
 
retaliatory arrest claim against the city despite the existence of 
probable cause to arrest.216 In United States v Al Jibori,217 a rare 
instance in which a court ordered discovery on a selective prose-
cution defense upon a showing of “direct admissions by [prosecu-
tors] of discriminatory purpose”218 under Armstrong footnote 
three, the evidence came in the form of the prosecutor’s affidavit.219 
Presumably, if the defendant had merely alleged the prose-
cutor said something to indicate his racial bias, discovery would 
not have been ordered. While drawing the line between credible 
and noncredible evidence is not a simple task, judges are 
equipped to determine when a plaintiff has met their burden just 
as they are in other areas of litigation. This rule would set the bar 
high enough to allay the majority’s concerns about screening out 
“doubtful” suits based on bare allegations about an officer’s state 
of mind,220 while giving plaintiffs more opportunity to use the ev-
idence available to them and avoiding the doctrinal problems of 
the Nieves majority’s more limiting rule.221 
3. How Nieves and similar cases come out under 
Armstrong. 
This proposed rule will significantly impact the many claims 
for which the underlying crime of arrest is neither a crime that 
police officers never make arrests for, like jaywalking, nor one 
that officers consistently make arrests for, like violent crimes. In 
those two situations, the parties are unlikely to dispute whether 
the narrow qualification applies. However, between these ex-
tremes are many offenses, such as disorderly conduct, for which 
officers exercise a significant amount of discretion as to whether 
to arrest the offender. In these cases, comparison-based evidence 
regarding arrest rates of similarly situated individuals may be 
extremely hard to come by—and may not always be indicative of 
retaliation—while strong evidence of unconstitutional intent may 
be more readily available. There is also reason to think that re-
taliatory arrests for these sorts of violations are not uncommon. 
 
 216 See id at 1955. 
 217 90 F3d 22 (2d Cir 1996). 
 218 Id at 25 (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted), quoting Armstrong, 517 
US at 469 n 3. 
 219 See Al Jibori, 90 F3d at 24–25. Al Jibori is discussed further in Part III.C.3. 
 220 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1725. 
 221 As discussed in Part IV, although Armstrong is generally regarded as a high bar, 
its application in the retaliatory arrest context will yield less harsh results, since plaintiffs 
will have more access to direct evidence of intent. 
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In 2015, the Department of Justice published a report regard-
ing conduct of police officers in Ferguson, Missouri and found 
that: 
[O]fficers frequently make enforcement decisions based on 
what subjects say, or how they say it. Just as officers reflex-
ively resort to arrest immediately upon noncompliance with 
their orders, whether lawful or not, they are quick to overre-
act to challenges and verbal slights. These incidents—some-
times called “contempt of cop” cases—are propelled by offic-
ers’ belief that arrest is an appropriate response to 
disrespect. These arrests are typically charged as a Failure 
to Comply, Disorderly Conduct, Interference with Officer, or 
Resisting Arrest.222 
Thus, a rule that would provide opportunities for plaintiffs to 
prove their claims in these scenarios is particularly important. 
Under Armstrong, Bartlett’s single personal affidavit alleg-
ing Officer Nieves’s statement would still not have been enough 
to proceed with his case. Without evidence regarding similarly 
situated individuals, Bartlett would have been required to make 
a more credible showing of intent to meet the threshold require-
ment. Bartlett only offered his own affidavit recounting the facts 
of his arrest, and Nieves’s statement would not have constituted 
“credible” evidence of intent. Though Armstrong will be helpful to 
many litigants who cannot obtain comparison-based evidence, it 
will only make a difference if they can proffer showings of intent 
that are more robust than Bartlett’s single affidavit. 
However, if Bartlett were able to provide a video of the officer’s 
statement or corroborating witness statements, he would have 
been able to proceed under Armstrong, even without comparison-
based evidence. This is important for two reasons. First, if easily 
and quickly verifiable evidence of Nieves’s animus existed, it 
would be a waste for a court to disregard it. If Bartlett already 
possessed evidence of Officer Nieves’s intent, asking the court to 
consider that evidence at the threshold level would not “threaten 
to set off ‘broad-ranging discovery’ in which ‘there often is no clear 
end to the relevant evidence,’” about which the majority is con-
cerned.223 Allowing Bartlett to present a cell phone video of the 
 
 222 US Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the Ferguson Po-
lice Department *25 (Mar 4, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/K9R6-BXGK. 
 223 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1725, quoting Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 817 (1982). 
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scene could potentially be very helpful to his case, at almost no 
cost to efficiency. 
Second, direct evidence of intent probably would have been 
Bartlett’s only hope, as the comparison-based showing does not 
track easily onto this case. The facts of Nieves illuminate how dif-
ficult it can be to determine whether the exception should apply 
using only comparison-based evidence. On one hand, disorderly 
conduct, which sometimes poses a threat to others, is a serious 
enough offense that Bartlett’s arrest may not count as a “circum-
stance[ ] where officers . . . typically exercise their discretion not 
to [arrest].”224 At the same time, from Chief Justice Roberts’s de-
scription of the campgrounds as “raucous” and the festival as “an 
event known for both extreme sports and extreme alcohol con-
sumption,”225 it seems likely that other partygoers were commit-
ting similar acts of disorderly behavior but were not arrested, so 
perhaps Bartlett was singled out. It is not clear from the major-
ity’s language which version of the rule is appropriate here. 
Should courts ask whether the typical disorderly conduct of-
fender is arrested, or whether other disorderly partygoers were 
arrested in the Hoodoo Mountains?226 The latter comparison is 
probably more relevant to the ultimate question of retaliation. 
However, proving that other partygoers could have been arrested 
for committing disorderly conduct at Arctic Man would require 
legal judgments about their behavior. Thus, it is not clear how a 
plaintiff like Bartlett could possibly get relief under the majority’s 
rule. The facts of Nieves itself tend to confirm Justice Sotomayor’s 
prediction that “there will be little daylight between the comparison-
based standard the Court adopts and the absolute bar it ostensi-
bly rejects.”227 
 
 224 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1727. See also note 152 (explaining that Nieves is not clear 
about whether, for the exception to apply, the crime of arrest must be a minor crime or if 
the primary inquiry is whether similarly situated people were not arrested). 
 225 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1720. 
 226 Courts have consistently struggled to define the similarly-situated-individuals 
analysis in many circumstances. See United States v Mumphrey, 193 F Supp 3d 1040, 1061 
(ND Cal 2016) (‘[T]here is no magic formula for determining who is similarly situated.”). 
As one scholar noted, “[a]lthough frequently invoked in the equal protection context, the 
‘similarly situated’ concept is not uniformly employed in the case law. Many important 
equal protection opinions contain no substantive ‘similarly situated’ analysis.” Giovanna 
Shay, Similarly Situated, 18 Geo Mason L Rev 581, 586 (2011), citing Grutter v Bollinger, 
539 US 306, 375 (2003) (Thomas concurring in part and dissenting in part), United States 
v Virginia, 518 US 515 (1996), Romer v Evans, 517 US 620 (1996), and Craig v Boren, 429 
US 190, 192 n 2 (1976). 
 227 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1741 (Sotomayor dissenting). 
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It may be the case that Bartlett would be similarly out of luck 
under the Armstrong standard, assuming he lacked any video evi-
dence or witness statements regarding Officer Nieves’s statement. 
Armstrong will not provide a remedy for all victims (if Bartlett 
was indeed victimized). However, applying Armstrong to retalia-
tory arrest claims in the manner this Comment advocates would 
give more plaintiffs a chance. This solution would also reflect that 
retaliation is an intent-based claim, like racial discrimination, not 
a claim based on reasonableness. While still rigorous, the more 
flexible Armstrong rule better reflects the doctrine and the facts 
of many arrest scenarios, like Bartlett’s, for which comparison-
based evidence may not be particularly helpful in determining 
whether retaliation occurred and would be difficult to obtain in 
any event. 
C. Challenges to the Armstrong Approach 
1. Justice Sotomayor’s concerns. 
Even if the Armstrong approach to retaliatory arrest litiga-
tion is consistent with precedent and helpful to plaintiffs, one may 
be concerned that Armstrong governs a distinct area of law and 
may be difficult to apply to retaliatory arrest lawsuits. The Arm-
strong framework applies a different constitutional provision to a 
different type of proceeding concerning a different subject matter. 
As Justice Sotomayor notes, applying Armstrong here would 
“take a doctrine applying (1) equal protection principles (2) in a 
criminal proceeding to (3) charging decisions by prosecutors, and 
ask it also to govern the application of (1) First Amendment prin-
ciples (2) in a suit for civil damages challenging (3) arrests by po-
lice officers.”228 This creates additional doctrinal thorns in an al-
ready thorny method of analysis, but each issue that Justice 
Sotomayor points out can be overcome. 
First, Armstrong concerned an equal protection challenge, 
whereas Nieves addresses the proper standard for First Amend-
ment retaliation claims. Although these two doctrines protect dif-
ferent rights, Justice Sotomayor herself notes that they are “in-
distinguishable” for these purposes since they “both inherently 
require inquiry into ‘an official’s motive.’”229 In fact, selective pros-
ecution jurisprudence already encompasses claims based on First 
 
 228 Id at 1742 (citation omitted). 
 229 Id at 1738, quoting Crawford-El, 523 US at 585. 
2020] A (Very) Unlikely Hero 2255 
 
Amendment retaliation, in addition to racial and other forms of 
discrimination prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. Former 
prosecutor Melissa L. Jampol explains that selective prosecution 
claims fall in “two subsets: those based on claims of racial discrim-
ination; and those based on other constitutionally impermissible 
infringements, such as First Amendment violations.”230 Although 
equal protection is at issue in Armstrong, selective prosecution 
allegations can also be “based on other constitutionally impermis-
sible infringements, such as First Amendment violations.”231 For 
example, in Wayte v United States,232 the plaintiff alleged that he 
was selectively prosecuted for failure to register for the Selective 
Service based on his vocal opposition to the draft, infringing on 
his First Amendment rights.233 The Court concluded that, not-
withstanding prosecutorial discretion, “the decision to prosecute 
may not be ‘deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard 
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification,’ including 
the exercise of . . . constitutional rights.”234 Thus, the selective 
prosecution framework articulated in Armstrong can be applied 
to charges of First Amendment retaliation as well. 
Second, Armstrong was written to govern criminal proceed-
ings in which a defendant raises an affirmative defense, rather 
than civil litigation. In general, Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 16 governs discovery in criminal proceedings.235 However, 
the standard created in Armstrong is premised on the fact that 
Rule 16 only governs discovery related to defenses “against the 
Government’s case in chief, but not to the preparation of selective-
prosecution claims.”236 Because selective prosecution is an affirm-
ative defense, its discovery standard functions similar to a 
 
 230 Melissa L. Jampol, Goodbye to the Defense of Selective Prosecution, 87 J Crim L & 
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 236 Armstrong, 517 US at 463. 
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threshold standard like the one Nieves establishes.237 For exam-
ple, in Marshall v Columbia Lea Regional Hospital,238 the Tenth 
Circuit directly analogized to Armstrong when it established a 
summary judgment standard for § 1983 selective enforcement 
claims, noting that “[i]n analogous contexts[ ] the Court has ‘taken 
great pains to explain that the standard is a demanding one.’”239 
Indeed, other courts have made use of Armstrong in § 1983 selec-
tive enforcement claims alleging denial of equal protection.240 
Third, defendants make selective prosecution challenges to 
prosecutors’ charging decisions rather than a police officer’s ar-
resting decision.241 This is important because courts afford prose-
cutors a presumption of regularity in their official decisions,242 
whereas courts generally show less deference to police officers.243 
In light of this, some circuits have applied a lower evidentiary 
standard to selective enforcement claims.244 However, this does 
not preclude applying Armstrong in the arrest context. At least 
two courts of appeals have determined that deference to the deci-
sions of police officers, as agents of the state and federal execu-
tives, requires that the “demanding” standard established in 
Armstrong applies to selective enforcement.245 As the Tenth Cir-
cuit explained, “[b]road discretion has been vested in executive 
branch officials to determine when to prosecute,” citing to Arm-
strong, “and by analogy, when to conduct a traffic stop or initiate 
an arrest.”246 Further, courts “[o]rdinarily [ ] presume that public 
 
 237 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1725 (aiming to avoid “set[ting] off ‘broad-ranging discovery’ in 
which ‘there often is no clear end to the relevant evidence’”), quoting Harlow, 457 US at 817. 
 238 345 F3d 1157 (10th Cir 2003). 
 239 Id at 1167 (emphasis added), quoting Armstrong, 517 US at 463. 
 240 See, for example, Richards v Gelsomino, 2019 WL 1535466, *8 (DDC), quoting 
Armstrong, 517 US at 465. 
 241 See Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1742 (Sotomayor dissenting). 
 242 See, for example, Armstrong, 517 US at 464 (“In the ordinary case . . . ‘the decision 
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally 
rests entirely in [the prosecutor’s] discretion.’”), quoting Bordenkircher, 434 US at 364. 
 243 See Siegler and Admussen, 115 Nw U L Rev at *35 (cited in note 153). 
 244 See, for example, United States v Sellers, 906 F3d 848, 856 (9th Cir 2018); United 
States v Washington, 869 F3d 193, 219–20 (3d Cir 2017); United States v Davis, 793 F3d 
712, 720–21 (7th Cir 2015). 
 245 See United States v Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F3d 1252, 1264 (10th Cir 2006), quoting 
Armstrong, 517 US at 463. See also United States v Mason, 774 F3d 824, 830 (4th Cir 
2014) (“In light of ‘the great danger of unnecessarily impairing the performance of a core 
executive constitutional function,’ petitioners must demonstrate ‘clear evidence’ of racially 
animated selective law enforcement.”), quoting United States v Olvis, 97 F3d 739, 743 (4th 
Cir 1996). 
 246 Marshall, 345 F3d at 1167, citing Armstrong, 517 US at 464. 
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officials have ‘properly discharged their official duties,’”247 so all 
government actors, including police officers, are afforded some 
level of deference. Nieves points out that police officers exercise 
discretion in who they arrest; the narrow qualification specifically 
deals with the instances in which officers clearly abuse that dis-
cretion.248 Thus, the presumption of regularity afforded to prose-
cutors does not foreclose application of Armstrong in the arrest 
context. 
While the selective-prosecution-defense framework does not 
track perfectly onto retaliatory arrest litigation, each of the three 
apparent difficulties can be overcome. At the same time, applying 
the Armstrong standard here avoids the doctrinal thorns that the 
Nieves rule creates.249 Although Armstrong and Nieves address 
different types of litigation, both retaliatory arrest and selective 
prosecution claims hinge on the unconstitutional motivations of 
government officials, and the applicable rules in both areas at-
tempt to balance the need to consider intent with the interest in 
screening out frivolous claims. 
2. Squaring Armstrong with Crawford-El v Britton. 
As this Comment argues, Armstrong is an improvement upon 
Nieves, but it is worth examining whether any heightened stand-
ard is appropriate for retaliatory arrest litigation. Justice So-
tomayor questions applying an Armstrong-like standard in the re-
taliatory arrest context because it could be inconsistent with 
Crawford-El v Britton.250 As Justice Sotomayor notes,251 the Court 
in Crawford-El rejected a similar “clear and convincing” standard 
for “constitutional claims that require proof of improper intent.”252 
In Crawford-El, a prison inmate filed a retaliation claim against 
a correctional officer, contending that the officer deliberately mis-
directed his personal property upon his transfer to another facil-
ity by giving his belongings to his brother-in-law rather than ship-
ping them to his next destination.253 Specifically, the plaintiff 
 
 247 Bracy v Gramley, 520 US 899, 909 (1997), quoting Armstrong, 517 US at 464. See 
also Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F3d at 1264 (“Executive-branch officials possess broad discre-
tion in determining when to make a traffic stop or an arrest.”). 
 248 See Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1727. 
 249 See Part III.A. 
 250 523 US 574 (1998). 
 251 See Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1742 (Sotomayor dissenting) (“[W]e rejected a very similar 
rule in Crawford-El.”). 
 252 Crawford-El, 523 US at 594. 
 253 Id at 577–78. 
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alleged that the officer acted in retaliation for a 1986 incident in 
which he invited a Washington Post journalist to visit the prison 
facility, resulting in a front-page article detailing the overcrowd-
ing crisis at the prison; a 1988 incident in which he complained to 
the prison administration about invasions of his privacy rights; 
and another 1988 incident in which he was quoted in the Wash-
ington Post as “saying that litigious prisoners had been ‘hand-
picked’ for transfer.”254 
The District of Columbia Circuit held that, to defeat a motion 
for summary judgment on an unconstitutional-motive claim, the 
plaintiff must provide “clear and convincing” evidence of improper 
state of mind.255 The Court of Appeals derived this heightened 
standard from Harlow v Fitzgerald.256 Harlow held that to defeat 
the qualified immunity defense, plaintiffs must provide objective 
evidence of unreasonable conduct, and “bare allegations of mal-
ice” are insufficient to subject government officials to the burdens 
of trial.257 In Crawford-El, the DC Circuit applied this rule to an 
affirmative claim of constitutional violation as well and was re-
versed by the Supreme Court.258 Justice John Paul Stevens ex-
plained that the objective standard from Harlow applies only 
when a plaintiff attempts to overcome qualified immunity, and it 
does not change the standard for the constitutional claim itself.259 
Thus, courts should not require plaintiffs to adduce “clear and 
convincing” evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment on 
constitutional claims involving improper motives.260 
Although Crawford-El rejected a “special rule”261 that im-
posed a blanket heightened burden of proof on all plaintiffs alleg-
ing unconstitutional-motive claims,262 it did not preclude using 
threshold standards in certain cases when additional showings 
 
 254 Id at 578–79 & n 1. 
 255 Id at 582–83. 
 256 457 US 800 (1982). 
 257 Harlow, 457 US at 817–18. 
 258 See Crawford-El, 523 US at 583 (discussing the DC Circuit’s reasoning); id at 589 
(holding that Harlow did not require this result). 
 259 See id. 
 260 Id at 594. 
 261 Id. 
 262 See Crawford-El, 523 US at 585–86. In Crawford-El, Justice Stevens worried that 
the DC Circuit’s heightened standard was “not limited to suits by prisoners against local 
officials, but [would] appl[y] to all classes of plaintiffs bringing damages actions against 
any government official . . . [and] to the wide array of different federal law claims for which 
an official’s motive is a necessary element.” Id at 585. 
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are necessary to prove causality.263 Indeed, the Court has been will-
ing to put constraints on certain types of improper-motive claims. 
For example, in Hartman, the Court created the no-probable-cause 
threshold for retaliatory prosecution claims due to concerns about 
proving causality and the presumption of regularity afforded to 
prosecutors.264 Justifying this rule, the Hartman Court cited to 
Crawford-El itself in explaining that “necessary details about 
proof of a connection between the retaliatory animus and the dis-
charge [ ] will depend on the circumstances,”265 so putting addi-
tional burdens on plaintiffs can be appropriate in some circum-
stances. Given subsequent cases like Hartman, Crawford-El 
cannot stand for the proposition that the Court is never permitted 
to impose additional constraints on § 1983 plaintiffs, so it should 
not preclude applying something like the Armstrong standard 
here. 
What’s more, Crawford-El suggests that Armstrong is a bet-
ter standard than the majority’s narrower carveout, since the 
Crawford-El Court specifically wanted to give plaintiffs a fair 
chance to prove their claims and avoid rules that place “a thumb 
on the defendant’s side of the scales.”266 While Crawford-El does 
not preclude applying threshold standards in all circumstances, 
the opinion clearly rejects rules that “undermine[ ] the very pur-
pose of § 1983—to provide a remedy for the violation of federal 
rights.”267 Nieves’s rigid rule will provide a remedy for few plain-
tiffs, since officers can find probable cause to arrest for even triv-
ial misconduct and comparison-based evidence will be impossible 
to find in most situations. Although Armstrong is burdensome, it 
avoids completely undermining § 1983 by at least allowing liti-
gants to use the evidence available to them, including direct evi-
dence of intent. Armstrong may still prevent some victims from 
obtaining redress. However, given the Court’s concern that too 





 263 See id at 593 (‘‘[A]t least with certain types of claims, proof of an improper motive is not 
sufficient to establish a constitutional violation—there must also be evidence of causation.’’). 
 264 See Hartman, 547 US at 261–63. 
 265 Id at 260, citing Crawford-El, 523 US at 593. 
 266 Crawford-El, 523 US at 593. 
 267 Id at 594–95. 
 268 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1725. 
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3. Using Armstrong’s footnote three despite a lack of case 
law. 
Finally, while Armstrong’s footnote three “expressly left open 
the possibility that . . . admissions[ of intent] might be enough to 
allow a claim to proceed,”269 it is worth examining if and when 
litigants use this footnote. Indeed, scholars criticize Armstrong on 
the basis that it requires defendants to provide comparison-based 
evidence “as an absolute condition of discovery.”270 Although crim-
inal defendants have had little success using Armstrong’s footnote 
three, the Court has not precluded it.271 Rather, criminal defend-
ants are rarely able to use evidence of discriminatory intent be-
cause “direct evidence of motive or intent is rarely available.”272 
“In general, the absence of . . . direct evidence of police motivation 
results in most claims being based on [ ] comparisons.”273 As 
Part IV.A discusses, because statements by prosecutors regard-
ing motivations behind their charging decisions are made primar-
ily behind closed doors, discriminatory effect is generally easier 
for defendants to prove than discriminatory intent.274 Thus, the 
Armstrong case law lacks many instances in which defendants 
circumvent the similarly-situated-individuals threshold by 
providing direct evidence of intent. 
 
 269 Id at 1734 (Gorsuch concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 270 McAdams, 73 Chi Kent L Rev at 606 (cited in note 153). See also Jampol, 87 J 
Crim L & Crimin at 960–63 (cited in note 230). 
 271 It should be noted that some courts have taken Armstrong to require showing of 
both discriminatory effect and intent to obtain discovery. See, for example, United States 
v Deberry, 430 F3d 1294, 1301 (10th Cir 2005) (“As Defendants have failed to present 
evidence satisfying Armstrong’s discriminatory-effect prong, we need not address whether 
the evidence they presented satisfied the discriminatory-intent prong.”). However, the text 
of Armstrong does not compel this conclusion, as the Court did not hold that evidence of 
effect would be required when the defendant has evidence of unconstitutional intent. In-
deed, some courts have noted that the extent to which Armstrong requires evidence of both 
effect and intent at different stages in litigation is unclear. See, for example, United States 
v Tuitt, 68 F Supp 2d 4, 10 (D Mass 1999) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s actual analysis of the 
evidence offered in Armstrong . . . in some ways appears to conflate the elements of effect 
and intent.”). 
 272 Branch Ministries, Inc v Richardson, 970 F Supp 11, 17 (DDC 1997) (“[E]vidence 
concerning the unequal application of the law, statistical disparities and other indirect 
evidence of intent may be used to show bias or discriminatory motive.”). Although direct 
evidence of prosecutorial intent is extremely difficult to obtain, evidence of a police officer’s 
intent may be more available to retaliatory arrest plaintiffs, as Part IV explains. 
 273 Marshall, 345 F3d at 1168. 
 274 See Kristin E. Kruse, Comment, Proving Discriminatory Intent in Selective Prose-
cution Challenges—An Alternative Approach to United States v. Armstrong, 58 SMU L 
Rev 1523, 1535 (2005) (“[T]here is rarely any direct evidence of discrimination, leaving 
only circumstantial evidence at best.”). 
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I was only able to identify one significant criminal case275 in 
which a court used Armstrong’s footnote three to allow a claim to 
move to discovery by virtue of direct evidence of prosecutorial in-
tent. In Al Jibori, the Second Circuit noted that Armstrong did 
not strictly require defendants to satisfy the similarly situated 
requirement when evidence of prosecutorial intent in the form of 
admissions exists, finding that the “case demonstrate[d] why ad-
missions should sometimes justify further inquiry.”276 The facts of 
Al Jibori are not typical. In the case, the defendant was arrested 
in John F. Kennedy International Airport and eventually charged 
with using a false passport under a somewhat rarely used federal 
statute.277 He moved to dismiss on the theory that he was selec-
tively prosecuted due to his religion, political affiliation, and re-
quest for asylum.278 Because the defendant offered no evidence 
that similarly situated individuals were not prosecuted, “[p]ursu-
ant to Armstrong, the government could have refused to comply 
[with discovery] without causing jeopardy to its prosecution.”279 
However, the trial court proceedings occurred before Arm-
strong was handed down.280 Rather than simply moving to dis-
miss, the government volunteered an affidavit of the prosecutor, 
who stated that “the decision to prosecute was based on the simi-
larity between [Chafat] Al Jibori’s case and that of the terrorist 
convicted in the World Trade Center bombing, both being middle 
easterners traveling on altered Swedish passports.”281 The court 
concluded that the only commonality between the defendant and 
the convicted terrorist was their regional origin, “a consideration 
which standing alone is an unconstitutional basis for selecting 
prosecution,” and remanded the case for further discovery.282 
 
 275 To identify cases in which defendants attempted to use evidence of intent to meet 
the discovery bar on claims of selective prosecution, I conducted several searches of cases 
referencing Armstrong: I searched for cases that included terms like “evidence of intent” 
and “showing of [the officer’s] intent” as well as cases including the word “footnote” or the 
specific language from Armstrong’s footnote three. I then reviewed the cases for references 
to the defendant trying to either (1) make a threshold showing of the officer’s unconstitutional 
intent or (2) otherwise sidestep the similarly-situated-individuals showing requirement.  
 276 Al Jibori, 90 F3d at 25. 
 277 See id at 23. 
 278 See id at 24–25. 
 279 Id at 25. 
 280 See Al Jibori, 90 F3d at 23 (noting that the district court entered judgment against 
defendant on September 15, 1995). 
 281 Id at 24 (emphasis added). 
 282 Id at 26. 
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While Al Jibori is clearly an outlier,283 it shows that Armstrong 
can be interpreted to allow courts to consider direct evidence of 
intent in lieu of comparison-based evidence at the discovery 
threshold level. 
The Tenth Circuit considered another case in which the liti-
gant sought to provide direct evidence of intent in Marshall v Co-
lumbia Lea Regional Hospital.284 Analogizing to Armstrong, the 
court considered the government’s motion for summary judgment 
on a § 1983 selective enforcement claim.285 The plaintiff did not 
proffer any evidence regarding similarly situated individuals, and 
instead he sought “to prove the racially selective nature of his stop 
and arrest not by means of statistical inference but by direct evi-
dence of [the officer’s] behavior.”286 The Tenth Circuit determined 
that the similarly-situated-individual requirement was not ap-
propriate in Marshall’s case, since the claim was grounded in the 
evidenced intent of the particular officer.287 
At the same time, most attempts by criminal defendants to 
sidestep the similarly-situated-individuals showing with direct 
evidence of intent have not been successful. However, this lack of 
success can be attributed to problems with the evidence offered, 
not because evidence of discriminatory intent can never allow de-
fendants to obtain discovery. For example, in United States v 
Mitchell,288 the Northern District of Texas considered whether de-
fendant’s allegation that his arresting officer said “I’m tired of you 
black guys from South Dallas thinking you can abuse white girls 
and get away with it. You’re going to the Feds” would allow him 
to proceed to discovery on his selective prosecution claim.289 The 
court rejected the defendant’s argument because he failed to cite 
prior cases in which defendants used direct evidence of intent to 
sidestep the comparison-based evidence requirement, and “even 
if he did, the evidence he has presented . . . does not show the 
prosecution’s discriminatory purpose,” only the police officer’s.290 
What’s more, the defendant’s sworn statement, on its own, 
would probably not be enough to meet Armstrong’s “clear” 
 
 283 See McAdams, 73 Chi Kent L Rev at 623 (cited in note 153) (noting that the gov-
ernment’s mistake in Al Jibori, submitting the affidavit, is unlikely to be repeated). 
 284 Marshall, 345 F3d at 1168. 
 285 See id at 1167. 
 286 Id at 1168. 
 287 See id. 
 288 2015 WL 367087 (ND Tex). 
 289 Id at *1. 
 290 Id at *2. 
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evidence requirement, even if it did refer to the prosecutor rather 
than the police officer. As noted in Part III.B.2, Armstrong would 
probably require evidence of intent that is more credible than the 
defendant’s affidavit. 
Because the defendant in Mitchell did not produce any case 
law based on footnote three, the trial court was reluctant to apply 
it. However, other problems with the evidence proffered would 
have defeated the defendant’s claim regardless.291 Thus, while the 
district court in Mitchell was not obviously convinced that Arm-
strong allowed the defendant to use discriminatory intent to meet 
the discovery threshold, there were several other problems with 
the defendant’s proffered evidence that also stood in the way of 
his success. Despite the scarcity of useful case law interpreting 
footnote three, there is no reason for courts to disregard the pos-
sibility that Armstrong allows for at least certain forms of evi-
dence of discriminatory intent to allow claims to proceed. Rather, 
footnote three has been of little use in selective prosecution claims 
due to practical problems—many of which do not apply in the re-
taliatory arrest context. 
IV.  RETALIATORY ARRESTS: A BETTER CONTEXT FOR ARMSTRONG 
THAN SELECTIVE PROSECUTION 
Armstrong is a notably difficult standard to meet, so courts 
should be cautious in extending it. Almost since it was decided, 
scholars and practitioners have criticized Armstrong as a pro-
hibitively high standard.292 Even if defendants can use either 
comparison-based evidence or prosecutorial admissions to meet 
its requirements, neither are feasible in most cases. Evidence re-
garding the nonprosecution of similarly situated individuals 
rarely exists, and if it does, it is likely kept by the prosecutor.293 
At the same time, direct evidence of prosecutorial intent is even 
 
 291 See, for example, id (explaining that evidence of the police officer’s intent was not 
relevant to the defendant’s claim because it did not show the prosecutor’s intent). 
 292 See, for example, Jampol, 87 J Crim L & Crimin at 932, 954 (cited in note 230) 
(noting that Armstrong “imposes a barrier that is too high for almost any defendant alleg-
ing selective prosecution to obtain discovery,” such that the requirements for obtaining 
discovery and the requirements for proving selective prosecution on the merits have “prac-
tically merge[d]”); Kruse, Comment, 58 SMU L Rev at 1534 (cited in note 274) (“[R]equir-
ing prima facie evidence before allowing discovery to obtain evidence appears to be a 
‘Catch 22.’”). 
 293 See Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 
135 U Pa L Rev 1365, 1373–74 (1987) (explaining that a defendant “cannot obtain discov-
ery unless she first makes a threshold showing,” which in turn “may be impossible without 
some discovery”). 
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harder to obtain. Fortunately, since retaliatory arrest plaintiffs 
are significantly more likely to have access to evidence of a police 
officer’s intent, the Armstrong threshold will be easier to meet 
here than in its original context. Compared with Nieves’s rigid 
rule, Armstrong would actually open up opportunities for retalia-
tory arrest plaintiffs, despite its unhelpfulness in selective prose-
cution cases. 
A. Accessible Evidence of Intent in Retaliatory Arrest Cases 
Meeting the threshold described in Armstrong is not an easy 
task. Although the Court asserted that, if selective prosecution 
truly occurred, meeting the discovery burden should not be “an 
insuperable task,”294 it pointed to only one case in which the de-
fendant was able to meet its discovery burden.295 Very few criminal 
defendants have been able to use Armstrong’s similarly-situated-
individual rule to their advantage, and many scholars have as-
serted that the rule essentially forecloses selective prosecution 
claims altogether. Professor Richard H. McAdams first noted that 
“for many crimes, Armstrong makes discovery impossible even 
where the defendant is a victim of selective prosecution.”296 For 
example, when the crime is so minor that it is generally not pros-
ecuted but for selective prosecution, a litigant would have to de-
tect and provide evidence of others who committed the violation 
but were not prosecuted.297 This proof problem may be even worse 
when the crime at issue is one usually committed in private.298 
Meeting Armstrong’s similarly-situated-individuals require-
ment often involves proving a negative, which makes it ex-
tremely difficult to meet.299 
As explained in Part III.C.3, defendants raising selective 
prosecution claims have not been able to make use of Armstrong 
footnote three arguments either, because direct evidence of dis-
criminatory intent on the part of a prosecutor is rarely, if ever, 
 
 294 Armstrong, 517 US at 470. 
 295 See id at 466, citing Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 US 356, 374 (1886). 
 296 McAdams, 73 Chi Kent L Rev at 623 (cited in note 153). 
 297 See id at 618. 
 298 See id at 620–21. 
 299 See Aziz Z. Huq, What Is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 Cornell L Rev 1211, 1279 
(2018) (“[S]ince such [similarly situated] defendants were not prosecuted . . . it will rarely 
be the case that documentary evidence of their existence will be available.”). 
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available.300 In general, prosecutors do not need to explain their 
charging decisions.301 If a prosecutor does make a statement 
evincing racial discrimination in their charging practices or re-
vealing that they pressed charges against a particular defendant 
in retaliation, they likely made that statement in the privacy of 
their office, producing no evidence that a criminal defendant 
could access. Evidence of statements made behind closed doors is 
not going to be available in most cases, though there are excep-
tions.302 It is hard to imagine criminal defendants reliably being 
able to produce this kind of smoking gun evidence of prosecutorial 
intent. For the most part, acquiring evidence of prosecutorial in-
tent would require the prosecutor affirmatively choosing to ex-
press their racially motivated intentions directly to the court, as 
the prosecutor did in Al Jibori.303 This situation is exceedingly 
rare.304 
In general, the Court’s equal protection cases recognize that 
direct evidence of unconstitutional intent in the form of state-
ments or admissions is often impossible to obtain, and instead al-
low litigants to use objective, comparison-based evidence.305 In 
Washington v Davis,306 the Court held that statutes must have a 
discriminatory purpose, not merely a disparate impact, to violate 
the Equal Protection Clause,307 but acknowledged that evidence 
of purpose will often be necessarily indirect, and “invidious dis-
criminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the 
relevant facts.”308 Direct evidence of purpose is rare. It is reason-
able to assume that the Armstrong Court did not expect any crim-
inal defendants to be able to produce direct evidence of the pros-
ecutor’s discriminatory intent, and instead created the (still very 
demanding) similarly-situated-individual showing requirement 
 
 300 See Jampol, 87 J Crim L & Crimin at 960 (cited in note 230) (“One potential way 
in which a defendant could meet the . . . threshold is an outright declaration of racial bias 
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 301 See Reiss, 135 U Pa L Rev at 1373 (cited in note 293). 
 302 Fane Lozman and his private city council meeting transcript come to mind, and 
the Court understood that it should not ignore Lozman’s proffered evidence of intent. See 
Lozman, 138 S Ct at 1954. 
 303 See Al Jibori, 90 F3d at 25. 
 304 See McAdams, 73 Chi Kent L Rev at 623 (cited in note 153) (noting “the govern-
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 305 See Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79, 93 (1986) (explaining that in equal protection 
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 306 426 US 229 (1976). 
 307 Id at 239. 
 308 Id at 242. 
2266 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:2029 
 
as an alternative mechanism to show discrimination. As commen-
tators have pointed out, however, the mechanism created by the 
Armstrong Court has essentially failed to help defendants, and 
criminal defendants have had little success in claiming selective 
prosecution.309 
While discriminatory purpose is often hidden from defend-
ants asserting selective prosecution, the retaliatory arrest context 
is different because police officers do their jobs in public, and thus 
are much more likely to be caught if they make statements evi-
dencing unconstitutional purpose. If a police officer yells at a ci-
vilian to cease his protest activities and then promptly arrests 
him, the interaction probably occurred in public and might have 
been heard by witnesses. Or, imagine a tougher scenario. Some-
one is smoking marijuana outside of a bar (in a state where using 
marijuana is criminalized), and a police officer sees him but 
passes him by until hearing him say to his friend, “God, I hate 
cops.” The officer then turns around, retorts, “You really shouldn’t 
have said that,” throws him in the squad car, and charges him for 
marijuana possession. The retaliatory nature of the arrest seems 
fairly clear—the officer disregarded the crime until he made the 
protected but inflammatory remark. If the bar’s security camera 
captured the exchange or the arrestee’s friend took a cell phone 
video, he has direct evidence of discriminatory purpose to bring 
to court. Since retaliatory arrest plaintiffs directly interact with 
police officers, and those interactions take place in public, they 
are more likely to be able to present evidence of discriminatory 
purpose than are defendants alleging selective prosecution. 
One might argue that direct evidence of intent to retaliate 
rarely exists because police officers are careful not to make com-
ments that evidence bad motives. As discussed, in the context of 
racially discriminatory prosecutions, courts note that “direct evi-
dence of motive or intent is rarely available.”310 However, in situ-
ations of retaliation, what triggers the police officer’s action is the 
plaintiff’s speech itself, so the officer is arguably more likely to 
respond with speech of his own. Comments evincing retaliatory 
intent aren’t made out of the blue, but rather in response to some-
thing someone else said. Considering this, a police officer saying 
out loud “you really shouldn’t have said that” in response to 
 
 309 See, for example, Jampol, 87 J Crim L & Crimin at 963 (cited in note 230) (stating 
that “the Supreme Court has set up a threshold that is too difficult for most defendants to 
meet, even those with potentially meritorious claims”). 
 310 Branch Ministries, Inc v Richardson, 970 F Supp 11, 17 (DDC 1997). 
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someone else’s offensive remarks seems plausible. Since victims 
and bystanders will be likely to witness (at least some of) these 
sorts of comments made by police officers in arrest scenarios, ev-
idence of intent could be available to many potential plaintiffs. 
Thus, an Armstrong-like rule would actually be useful to litigants 
in this context, giving plaintiffs a chance to use the evidence they 
have available to them. 
B. Cellphone Videos and Police Accountability 
That at least some victims of retaliatory arrest will be able to 
produce evidence of police intent is particularly true given the in-
crease in video surveillance of police-civilian interactions and cor-
responding availability of clear evidence of officer intent and mis-
conduct. As Justice Sotomayor points out, “more than ever before, 
an audiovisual record of key events is now often obtainable,” so 
courts should accommodate evidentiary standards as to not “for-
sake this body of probative evidence.”311 It is difficult to overstate 
the impact of technology on the public’s ability to document and 
share images of their experiences. Professor Seth F. Kreimer has 
termed this phenomenon “pervasive image capture,” noting how 
increased cell phone ownership, the decreased cost of shooting 
photos and videos, and the proliferation of distribution channels 
like YouTube have combined to create a nearly all-seeing pub-
lic.312 In particular, the rise of cell phones with video-recording 
capabilities has facilitated widespread efforts by passersby to doc-
ument interactions between police officers and civilians.313 “Re-
cording technology now is smaller, cheaper, easier to operate, eas-
ier to hide, and more pervasive, expanding personal opportunities 
to record events,” including “individual encounters with police 
and political rallies in which the recorder is a participant.”314 
Third-party recordings of police interactions gone wrong are 
commonplace. Bystander videos of stops and arrests gone bad 
have sparked significant public discourse about policing practices 
and been used in civil and criminal proceedings against police 
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officers involved in those incidents.315 Particularly striking exam-
ples are the recordings of the tragic deaths of Eric Garner in July 
2014, Michael Brown in August 2014, and George Floyd in May 
2020, which were captured by bystanders.316 The New York Times 
compiled thirty-two instances of police abuse of people of color 
since 2014 that were captured on video, and of those many were 
filmed by third parties.317 This is a marked change from the cir-
cumstances surrounding the beating of Rodney King, “in which a 
bystander happened upon [the scene] and videotaped the incident 
for public consumption, arguably [ ] an outlier in 1991, [and] de-
pendent on the then-rare fortuity of an individual having a video 
camera and on the mainstream media running with the video and 
the story.”318 
While instances of police brutality raise different issues than 
a typical retaliatory or otherwise discriminatory arrest, all civil 
rights plaintiffs are aided by the rise of bystander videos. At a 
basic level, bringing any kind of civil rights claim against a police 
officer entails convincing the court that the officer did something 
wrong while the officer (usually) claims that they did not. The 
plaintiff needs to give the court a reason to believe that the officer 
really did tell them to “shut up” just before arresting them at a 
protest. A bystander video could be just what she needs. If a by-
stander had caught Officer Nieves’s alleged statement as he was 
arresting Bartlett, Bartlett would have had a shot at proving his 
claims. 
Professor Jocelyn Simonson has also documented the growth 
of organized police-watching groups, who may be able to provide 
powerful witness testimony and video evidence.319 While these 
groups have existed since at least the 1960s, they have prolifer-
ated in the last twenty years, and since 2014, “patrols have 
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sprung up in Ferguson, St. Louis, Chicago, New York City, Balti-
more, and Boston, and copwatching continues to expand to new 
regions of the country.”320 While the primary goal of these groups 
is deterring misconduct, not documenting it, Simonson notes that 
copwatchers often film police-civilian interactions and assist civil 
rights litigants by providing documentation in court.321 Though 
copwatching is not a new phenomenon, cell phone technology has 
almost certainly increased the potency of these activities, espe-
cially in their power to aid civil rights litigants in court. 
The ubiquity of cell phone videos taken by bystanders as well 
as security cameras in public places means that video depictions 
of many police-citizen interactions are becoming more easily 
available than ever before.322 Increasingly, plaintiffs alleging re-
taliatory, or otherwise discriminatory, arrests will be able to pro-
vide evidence of a police officer’s unconstitutional intent in the 
form of video depictions of statements evincing retaliatory ani-
mus. This type of evidence is probative and illuminating, and it 
has the potential to quickly dispel factual questions early in the 
litigation process. Allowing plaintiffs to present this evidence at 
the threshold level gives them a chance to show the court that 
their case might really have merit, even if they cannot provide 
proof that others were not arrested in a similar circumstance. 
Such comparison-based evidence might be impossible to obtain, if 
it even exists. Further, since the heart of retaliatory arrest claims 
is the question whether the officer made the arrest with the intent 
to punish or suppress speech, it makes little sense to ignore evi-
dence of intent at any stage of litigation. While the Nieves major-
ity’s rule requires courts to ignore this probative evidence at the 
threshold level, applying Armstrong to retaliatory arrest cases, 
and using its footnote three to consider direct evidence at the start 
of litigation, is more consistent with precedent. Perhaps as im-
portantly, this rule will give retaliatory arrest victims a better 
chance to use the evidence available to them to hold law enforce-
ment officers accountable for their actions, protecting civil rights 
from erosion. 
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CONCLUSION 
Under Nieves, plaintiffs must prove lack of probable cause, 
except in “circumstances where officers have probable cause to 
make arrests, but typically exercise their discretion not to do 
so.”323 Running contrary to the Court’s unconstitutional-motive 
cases, Nieves exempts plaintiffs from the no-probable-cause rule 
only if they can provide objective evidence that similarly situated 
individuals, not exercising their free speech rights, would not 
have been arrested.324 This rule is similar to Armstrong’s discov-
ery burden, but importantly, Armstrong does not bar litigants 
from using direct evidence of unconstitutional purpose in the form 
of admissions to proceed to discovery.325 Retaliatory arrest, like 
selective prosecution, is contingent on unconstitutional intent, 
not Fourth Amendment reasonableness. In Armstrong, the Court 
created a mechanism for defendants to demonstrate discrimina-
tion. Because unconstitutional intent is better demonstrated by 
statements of intent than by comparison-based evidence, Arm-
strong provides a sounder framework for retaliatory arrest claims 
than the majority’s rule. 
Perhaps more importantly, using the Armstrong framework 
will create many more opportunities for victims of retaliatory ar-
rest to use the evidence most likely to be available to them—evi-
dence of intent. While defendants alleging selective prosecution 
have seen little success using Armstrong, direct evidence of mo-
tive is available more often in the retaliatory arrest context. Po-
lice officers operate in public, where witnesses and cameras 
abound, in contrast to prosecutors who make their (potentially 
discriminatory) charging decisions in private. Thus, officers’ 
statements of intent are more likely to be witnessed and captured. 
Given the rise of police-watching efforts, in which passersby film 
police-civilian encounters, and the widespread use of security 
cameras in public places, direct evidence of unconstitutional mo-
tivations is becoming more available to plaintiffs. They should be 
permitted to make use of it. 
While subjective intent may not bear on Fourth Amendment 
claims, Nieves demonstrates the importance of not shutting out 
consideration of intent in other contexts. Intent-based claims, like 
retaliation and racial discrimination, do not rise and fall with the 
 
 323 Nieves, 139 S Ct at 1727. 
 324 Id. 
 325 See Armstrong, 517 US at 469 n 3. 
2020] A (Very) Unlikely Hero 2271 
 
objective reasonableness of behavior. These actions serve to catch 
unconstitutional behavior that looks reasonable on paper, but 
that those who were there—those who heard the officer’s animus-
laced comments—knew was unlawful. If evidence of intent is shut 
out at the threshold level, Fourth Amendment doctrine threatens 
to swallow constitutional claims against police officers that de-
pend on intent, despite the different purposes the claims serve. 
When victims come forward with clear evidence of a police of-
ficer’s malintent, there is no reason for courts to disregard it. 
 
